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They tortured him and did some evil things too evil to repeat. 
There was screaming sounds inside the barn, 
There was laughing sounds out on the street.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Sometime during the summer of 1955, Emmett Till left the bustling 
metropolis of Chicago for the quiet pastoral of the Mississippi Delta.  
Till’s mother had arranged for her son to spend time with his uncle, 
Moses Wright, who lived in a small town named Money, not far from 
the sleepy oak-lined streets of Greenwood.  Only fourteen, Till knew 
little of Mississippi’s past or of its strict code of racial conduct, a code 
that was enforced both legally, through an elaborate system of statutory 
prohibitions on interracial contact, and extralegally, through vigilante 
action.  Till’s unfamiliarity with local norms made him bold enough 
to do the unthinkable: to try to impress a cadre of local youths by 
approaching a white woman and⎯as that woman later testified in 
court⎯propositioning her.2
Retribution proved swift.  Not long after Till approached Carolyn Bryant, 
her husband Roy Bryant and his half-brother J.W. Milam knocked on the 
door of Moses Wright’s house and asked for the boy.  Brandishing arms, 
Milam and Bryant seized Till, drove him to a remote location near the 
Tallahatchie River, and tortured him.3  As far as authorities could tell 
from Till’s body, later found floating in the river, the torture session 
lasted for hours as Milam and Bryant alternately punched, pistol-
whipped, shot, and eventually drowned the boy, tying him with barbed 
wire to a two-hundred-pound cotton gin fan.4
Though the torture and murder took place outside of the public eye, 
the savagery of the crime attracted national attention when Till’s mother 
Mamie Bradley ordered the body brought back to Chicago.5  Once there, 
Bradley left her son’s casket open in a public wake, attracting thousands 
 1. BOB DYLAN, The Death of Emmett Till (1963). 
 2. Some claimed that Till whistled at Carolyn Bryant.  Others, including Carolyn 
herself, claimed that he entered her store and propositioned her.  STEPHEN J. WHITFIELD,
A DEATH IN THE DELTA: THE STORY OF EMMETT TILL 15–19 (1988).  Recent evidence 
suggests that Till acted on a dare, attempting to impress his peers by approaching a white 
woman.  THE LYNCHING OF EMMETT TILL: A DOCUMENTARY NARRATIVE xiii (Christopher 
Metress ed., 2002);  HENRY HAMPTON & STEVE FAYER, VOICES OF FREEDOM: AN ORAL
HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT FROM THE 1950S THROUGH THE 1980S, at 3
(1990) (quoting Till’s cousin Curtis Jones). 
 3. William Bradford Huie, The Shocking Story of Approved Killing in Mississippi,
LOOK, Jan. 24, 1956, at 46. 
4. Id.
 5. Till’s wake is described in Bury Slain Boy, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Sept. 7, 1955, at 5. 
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of viewers.6  Charles Diggs, a black congressman from Detroit, later 
explained how a picture of Till’s partly decomposed, mangled corpse⎯
reprinted in Jet magazine⎯turned the incident into a national scandal.7
“I think that was probably one of the greatest media products in the last 
forty or fifty years,” recounted Diggs, “because that picture stimulated a 
lot of interest and a lot of anger on the part of blacks all over the 
country.”8
Although the anger generated by Till’s murder is often cited as a 
catalyst for the civil rights movement, it sparked other significant legal 
changes as well.  Precisely because it came on the heels of the Supreme 
Court’s 1954 ruling in Brown v. Board of Education, Till’s death 
convinced then-Mississippi Governor James P. (J.P.) Coleman that 
certain aspects of the state’s handling of racial matters had to change.  
Afraid that popular outrage over racial violence might encourage federal 
intervention in the region, Coleman removed power from local sheriffs, 
expanded state police, and modernized the state’s criminal justice 
apparatus to reduce the chance of further racial violence in the state.  
Though his results proved mixed, many of Coleman’s reforms lived on, 
contributing to the end of public torture and lynching as accepted modes 
of punishment in the state.  This Article discusses those changes, 
repositioning Till’s murder, and Brown, in the historical narrative of the 
time, suggesting that they not only contributed to the fight for civil 
rights but also to the modernization of criminal justice in the South. 
Although legal historians have shown that civil rights triggered an 
explosion of extremism in the South,9 Coleman’s response to Till 
suggests that the struggle for racial equality also prompted a change in 
how Southern officials responded to racial violence.  It pushed the South 
to centralize authority, rein in local officials, improve the administration 
of justice, and adopt a less violent stance towards blacks⎯at least 
publicly.  Long decried for its toleration of the public torture and lynching 
of African-Americans, Mississippi began to discourage any form of 
public racial violence in the aftermath of Till’s murder.  Though the 
torture of African-Americans and of civil rights activists did not stop, it 
assumed a more surreptitious role in political life. 
6. Id.
 7. HAMPTON & FAYER, supra note 2, at 7.
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE 
SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 398–421 (2004). 
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To show how this happened, this Article will proceed in seven parts.  
Part I will provide some background on race relations in Mississippi, 
using Coleman’s political career as a lens through which to view the 
state’s struggle to deal with racial violence in the aftermath of World 
War II.  Part II will discuss the rise of extremism in the state immediately 
following Brown⎯and how Coleman resisted it.  Part III will discuss 
Coleman’s efforts to counterbalance the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People’s (NAACP) attempts to use the murder 
of Emmett Till, along with crimes against other African-Americans, as a 
device for rallying popular support in favor of federal intervention in 
Mississippi as early as the 1950s.  Part IV will re-cover Coleman’s efforts at 
modernization, showing how he centralized state law enforcement power 
in an attempt to rein in local sheriffs and to thwart extremists.  Part V 
will discuss Coleman’s use of black informants to reduce the chance of 
racial violence in the state.  Part VI will discuss Coleman’s response to 
the lynching of Mack Charles Parker, an African-American accused of 
raping a twenty-three-year-old white woman in 1959.  Part VII will 
show that, even though Coleman was replaced by extremist Ross Barnett 
in 1960, Coleman returned to the task of imposing a strict vision of anti-
extremist yet tough law enforcement in 1965 as a President Lyndon 
Johnson appointee to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
Why re-cover the story of Mississippi’s response to Emmett Till now?  
There are at least three reasons.  First, recent Supreme Court rulings 
have convinced many that Brown’s legacy amounts to little more than a 
call for ending overtly discriminatory laws.10  Re-covering Mississippi’s 
response to Till suggests that Brown also contributed to a dramatic 
transformation in Southern criminal justice, a transformation that reduced 
local autonomy, increased centralized control, and modernized Southern 
approaches to maintaining social order. 
Understanding the process of modernization that occurred in 
Mississippi in the 1950s helps explain how states known for using the 
“spectacle” of violence to maintain social peace moved towards a more 
“gentle way in punishment,” namely mass incarceration.11  As of 2005, 
10. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 
2738, 2768 (2007).  For responses, see Stephen J. Caldas & Carl L. Bankston III, A Re-
Analysis of the Legal, Political, and Social Landscape of Desegregation from Plessy v. 
Ferguson to Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 
2007 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 217 (2007); Goodwin Liu, Seattle and Louisville, 95 CAL. L.
REV. 277 (2007); Joseph O. Oluwole & Preston C. Green, III, Charter Schools: Racial-
Balancing Provisions and Parents Involved, 61 ARK. L. REV. 1 (2008). 
 11. I borrow the term gentle punishment from Michel Foucault, who tracks the 
decline of public torture in France during the eighteenth century.  During that time, 
France moved away from “the spectacle of the scaffold” and towards a more “gentle way 
in punishment.”  Mississippi’s official attitude towards lynching exhibited a similar path.  
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Mississippi was fourth in the nation for the percentage of its population 
in prison, with all of the highest percentages being in the South.12
Although a disproportionate number of these prisoners are African-
Americans,13 Coleman’s reforms also facilitated control of whites.  This 
means that the push for freedom in the Deep South contributed not just 
to desegregation but also to the rise of a more centralized, intrusive 
police state. 
Mississippi’s turn away from localism towards a more intrusive state 
helps explain the final reason for re-covering its response to Till.  From 
the beginning of the Civil War until the 1950s, Mississippi relied on not 
only legal regulations or law enforcement to preserve its racial hierarchy 
but also on the private torture and murder of African-Americans, a 
process known as lynching.14  Though never formally sanctioned by law, 
lynching was rarely interfered with by law enforcement.15  Precisely 
because lynching occurred in plain view, it acted as a type of public 
ritual, a “spectacle” aimed at disciplining the African-American population 
while galvanizing the white.16  Critical to this spectacle was not simply 
the execution of black victims but also the torture of them, including the 
“marking of victims” and punishing them in “spectacular” ways, such as 
dismembering, burning, or hanging.17
Although Governor Coleman did not bring an absolute end to the 
spectacle of lynching, he did facilitate a larger transformation in 
punishment, shifting it from public spectacle to juridical obscurity.  No 
MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 32, 104 (Alan Sheridan trans., Pantheon 
Books 1977) (1975). 
 12. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 2008, at 34 
(2008), available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/One%20in% 
20100.pdf.
13. Id.
 14. Though lynching occurred during the antebellum period, it took on a “new 
significance” during and after the Civil War.  JACQUELYN DOWD HALL, REVOLT AGAINST 
CHIVALRY: JESSIE DANIEL AMES AND THE WOMEN’S CAMPAIGN AGAINST LYNCHING 131 
(1993); see also ARTHUR F. RAPER, THE TRAGEDY OF LYNCHING 25–32 (1969); 
CHRISTOPHER WALDREP, THE MANY FACES OF JUDGE LYNCH: EXTRALEGAL VIOLENCE 
AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 9–10, 67–71, 86–87, 90–91 (2002).  Lynching increased 
dramatically following the disfranchisement of African-Americans in the 1890s.  See,
e.g., Terence Finnegan, Lynching and Political Power in Mississippi and South 
Carolina, in UNDER SENTENCE OF DEATH: LYNCHING IN THE SOUTH 189, 201–09 (W. 
Fitzhugh Brundage ed., 1997). 
 15. Larry J. Griffin et al., Narrative and Event: Lynching and Historical Sociology, in
UNDER SENTENCE OF DEATH: LYNCHING IN THE SOUTH, supra note 14, at 24, 33. 
16. See FOUCAULT, supra note 11, at 34; see also HALL, supra note 14, at 139. 
 17. FOUCAULT, supra note 11, at 34; see also HALL, supra note 14, at 139. 
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longer of use to public governance, torture became a more sporadic, 
surreptitious practice.  Precisely because of the public outrage at the manner 
in which Till had been mangled, future tortures had to be carried out in a 
way that left no trace.  For those alarmed at the apparent resurgence of 
torture in the twenty-first-century United States, re-covering Coleman’s 
story helps to cast new torture tactics like waterboarding and the horrors 
of Abu Ghraib in a new light—products not simply of an increased 
ferocity but an increased attention, ironically, to civil rights. 
II. LESSONS FROM THE PAST
Born in 1914, J.P. Coleman grew up on a farm in Mississippi’s hill 
country⎯a region known for an “unprecedented outbreak” of lynching 
in the 1890s.18  When Coleman was five, a second wave of lynching 
washed across the South, prompted by the return of black soldiers from 
World War I.19  Had his grandfather not influenced him, Coleman might 
have grown to view lynching as a natural part of the established social 
order, but the old Confederate soldier encouraged the boy to read the 
Congressional Record, pointing him in a direction that would lead him 
to the heart of national politics.  Inspired by what he read, Coleman 
began to borrow law books from a district attorney in Ackerman, 
Mississippi, named Aaron Lane Ford.  When Ford decided to run for a 
U.S. House of Representatives seat in 1934, he asked Coleman to go 
through the Record to find information on his opponent Thomas Jefferson 
Busby.  Coleman ably compiled a notebook documenting Busby’s 
absences from particular votes, prompting Ford to invite him to take a 
job on his staff in Washington.20
Coleman’s move to the nation’s capital, where he worked as Ford’s 
secretary by day and attended classes at the George Washington University 
School of Law by night, proved enlightening.  For the next four years, he 
immersed himself in political life, listened to Supreme Court oral 
arguments, attended congressional debates, and participated in the Little 
Congress, an organization of young clerks that met in the House Caucus 
room to introduce and debate mock bills.  During one debate, Coleman 
led a successful challenge to an initiative brought by a young Texan 
named Lyndon Baines Johnson, sparking a lifelong friendship between 
 18. Finnegan, supra note 14, at 205. 
 19. HALL, supra note 14, at 60, 61. 
 20. CTR. FOR ORAL HISTORY & CULTURAL HERITAGE, UNIV. OF S. MISS., ORAL
HISTORY WITH THE HONORABLE J.P. COLEMAN, FORMER GOVERNOR OF MISSISSIPPI AND 
CHIEF JUDGE (RET.), THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 40 (1982), 
http://cdm.lib.usm.edu/cgi-bin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/coh&CISOPTR=1223&CISO
MODE=print [hereinafter INTERVIEW OF J.P. COLEMAN]. 
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the two.21  When Coleman ran for governor in 1955, Johnson contributed 
financially to his campaign, and in turn, Coleman supported Johnson for 
the Presidency in 1956, 1960, and 1964.22
From Washington, D.C., Mississippi looked different.  Coleman arrived 
just in time to see the election of Mississippi Senator Theodore Bilbo, a 
populist who became infamous for engaging in vitriolic displays of 
racial extremism on the Senate floor, attacking anti-lynch laws, and 
blasting African-Americans for wanting to mongrelize the white race.23
Though Coleman admired Bilbo for being “friendly and democratic,” he 
came to believe that Bilbo’s virulent racism did Mississippi a 
“disservice.”24  Instead, Coleman thought that the South should project a 
positive image to the nation, striving to “be on good terms with the people 
from the North,” precisely so that it could develop positive national 
relationships conducive to its own political interests.25
Southern history bolstered Coleman’s appreciation for national opinion.  
By the time he became Governor in 1956, he had accumulated over four 
hundred books on the Civil War26 and reminded voters repeatedly of the 
“dark days of . . . reconstruction” when the federal government sent 
troops to occupy Southern states.27  Conversely, he also reminded voters 
that the Supreme Court had once been an ally of the South during the 
decades following the Civil War⎯and could be again.28  In fact, Coleman 
even published an article on post-Civil War politics that coincided, in 
many ways, with his campaign to mount a legalist response to the 
21. Id. at 4. 
 22. Coleman expressed his support for Johnson in the 1956 Presidential race in a 
letter.  See Letter from J.P. Coleman, Governor, Miss., to Lyndon B. Johnson, U.S. 
Senator, Tex. (Sept. 24, 1956) (on file with the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and 
Museum).  For Coleman’s support of Johnson in subsequent elections, and for Johnson’s 
support of Coleman’s gubernatorial bid, see INTERVIEW OF J.P. COLEMAN, supra note 20, 
at 144–45. 
 23. A. WIGFALL GREEN, THE MAN BILBO 4–5, 98–105, 124–25 (1963); CHESTER 
M. MORGAN, REDNECK LIBERAL: THEODORE G. BILBO AND THE NEW DEAL 1–2, 47–51, 
224–28 (1985). 
 24. INTERVIEW OF J.P. COLEMAN, supra note 20, at 54. 
25. Id. at 56.  Coleman discussed Bilbo in his interview with Dr. Orley B. Caudill.  
See id. at 53–54.  For coverage of the 1935 lynch law debates in Congress, see Senate
Holds Firm for Lynching Test: Southerners’ Plan to Adjourn and Thereby Sidetrack Bill 
is Defeated Again, 37 to 28, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1935, at 20. 
26. Mississippi: The Six-Foot Wedge, TIME, Mar. 4, 1957, at 24. 
 27. J.P. Coleman, Att’y Gen. of Miss., Address, Meeting the School Crisis 2 (June 
1, 1954). 
28. Id. at 2–3, 6. 
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Supreme Court in the 1950s.29  In it, he showed how Mississippi leaders 
in the 1890s had feared that defiance “would bring evils upon the state,” 
not least among them “adverse congressional legislation.”30
Coleman confronted Northern “evils” firsthand after returning to 
Mississippi and serving as attorney general.31  Not long after taking office, 
Coleman defended the death sentence of an alleged black rapist named 
Willie McGee.32  McGee, who was first convicted in 1945 for raping a 
white woman, became an international cause célèbre when a left-leaning, 
Northern-based civil rights organization called the Civil Rights Congress 
(CRC) discovered that McGee had been having a consensual affair with 
his alleged victim.33  The CRC decided not only to take up the case but 
to use it as a propaganda tool against the South, sending a full motorcade 
to Jackson, Mississippi, in 1950.34  Thanks in part to the CRC, McGee 
gained outside representation from New York attorney and future 
Congresswoman Bella Abzug, who battled Coleman all the way to the 
Supreme Court.35  Coleman’s eventual victory over Abzug before the 
nation’s highest tribunal reinforced his conviction that the Court could 
ultimately become a Southern ally even as it alerted him to the manner 
in which outside groups could use Southern atrocities to fuel Northern 
propaganda.36  The McGee case alone, for example, led to demonstrations 
in New York and letters from as far away as China pleading for 
McGee’s release.37
 29. James P. Coleman, The Origin of the Constitution of 1890, 19 J. MISS. HIST. 69
(1957).
30. Id. at 73.  Coleman quoted these words, which were initially spoken by Judge 
Robert H. Thompson at a Mississippi State Bar Association meeting in 1923 about the 
1890 Constitutional Convention, in an article that he wrote for the Journal of Mississippi 
History. See id. at 72.  In that piece, Coleman also noted a turn to legalist evasion as a 
means of denying the black vote in 1890.  Id. at 87.  For more on legalist evasion 
surrounding black voting rights, see J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN 
POLITICS: SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH,
1880–1910 (1974). 
 31. CECIL L. SUMNERS, THE GOVERNORS OF MISSISSIPPI 125–28 (1980). 
 32. For Coleman’s role in the case and before the Supreme Court, see M’Gee 
Execution Stayed by Court: High Bench Will Rule on New Appeal Justice Black Scores 
‘Pressure’ Telegrams, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1951, at 23. 
33. See SARAH HART BROWN, STANDING AGAINST DRAGONS: THREE SOUTHERN 
LAWYERS IN AN ERA OF FEAR 103–05 (1998). 
34. Group Joins in Fight for Execution Stay, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1950, at 23. 
 35. BROWN, supra note 33, at 104; M’Gee’s Fourth Plea Fails in High Court, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 27, 1951, at 20. 
36. M’Gee’s Fourth Plea Fails in High Court, supra note 35. 
37. Chinese Reds Protest McGee Case to Truman, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1950, at 
32; Group Joins in Fight for Execution Stay, supra note 34; 1,000 in Times Square 
Rally: ‘Save Willie McGee’ Group is Routed by the Police, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1950, at 
32.
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Coleman’s experience securing the execution of Willie McGee⎯along 
with his early experiences in Washington⎯helps to explain his response 
to Till.  Just as he had learned that racial extremism did not help 
Theodore Bilbo’s image nationally, so too did he fear that the reptilian 
violence of Till’s murder might jeopardize the state.  In addition, just as 
the McGee case generated unwanted Northern publicity for Mississippi, 
so too did the acquittal of Milam and Bryant inflame the national press.  
Avoiding further bad press struck Coleman as crucial, particularly in 
light of the Supreme Court’s recent ruling demanding desegregated 
schools in Brown.  Throughout his time as governor, Coleman remained 
convinced that integration would only occur if Northern power forced it.  
In his opinion, desegregation was not a priority for Mississippi blacks 
but was a radical Northern goal, sponsored by left-wing, elitist groups 
who had little concern for average Southern people.  Coleman’s battles 
with the CRC⎯an organization that had little if any tie to blacks in 
Mississippi⎯only reinforced this view.  To him, such groups obfuscated 
the fact that Brown was bad for both races and that segregation was a 
mutually beneficial arrangement.  “I am for segregation not because I 
hate [N]egroes,” he wrote one constituent in 1958, but “because I know 
from experience, as you do, that it is for the best interest of both races.”38
To him, segregation was a “kindness” that made life “easier” for blacks 
by keeping them protected from white extremists, ultimately representing 
an “implement o[f] orderly, peac[e]able government.”39  Not only did it 
neutralize racial tension, but segregation also allowed blacks to improve 
their lives free from white interference and control. 
Of course, implicit in such a view was an inability to see how 
segregation actually reinforced racial subordination.  For example, not 
only did Jim Crow laws separate whites and blacks in public spaces, but 
they also facilitated a remarkable disparity in resource allocation.  For 
blacks, public accommodations were not only set apart from whites, for 
example, but were often considerably inferior.  Black schools received 
less money, black neighborhoods received fewer public services, black 
hospitals were poorer, and black chances to rise out of poverty were 
blocked by obstacles to professional education, licensing, and voting.  
Coleman’s inability to see the potentially devastating effects of such 
 38. Letter from J.P. Coleman, Governor, Miss., to C.C. Smith (Apr. 10, 1958) (on 
file with the Mississippi Department of Archives and History) [hereinafter Letter from 
J.P. Coleman to C.C. Smith]. 
39. Id.
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barriers to black advancement reflected a deeper blindness that, although 
not vitriolic or violent, nevertheless made it impossible for him to 
understand black demands in Mississippi at the time.  Indeed, Coleman 
was shocked when black leaders who had previously assured white 
officials that they opposed integration later summoned the courage to 
denounce segregation during a meeting with Governor Hugh White in 
Jackson in July 1954.  Rather than take this as a sign of black frustration 
with segregation, however, Coleman took it as the reverse: evidence that 
groups like the CRC and NAACP were brainwashing black leaders.40
Confident that neither blacks nor whites wanted to send their children 
to integrated schools, Coleman campaigned for Governor of Mississippi 
in 1955 on a platform of improving black education while preventing 
racial violence.  Committed to the notion that segregation was in fact 
good for both races, Coleman consciously avoided making negative 
statements about African-Americans and refused to endorse extremist 
white organizations, such as the Citizens’ Councils.  This was particularly 
remarkable given that the Councils had, since the summer of 1954, 
amassed considerable popular support in favor of outright defiance to the 
Supreme Court.41  Coleman was the only one of five gubernatorial 
candidates who did not endorse the Councils⎯a move that he rationalized 
by emphasizing the importance of serving “all the people” in the state.42
That he won the election suggests that Mississippi voters, who were 
overwhelmingly against desegregation, remained somewhat open to the 
idea that there might be more than one way of dealing with the Supreme 
Court⎯besides just defiance⎯as late as 1955.43
III. RESISTING “NULLIFICATION”
One of the earliest indications that J.P. Coleman opposed defiance 
came only two weeks after the Brown ruling on June 1, 1954.  
Responding to concerns about the Supreme Court’s desegregation order, 
Coleman went on Mississippi television and proclaimed confidently that 
there was “plenty” that the state could do to preserve segregated schools 
40. See INTERVIEW OF J.P. COLEMAN, supra note 20, at 94–95; Mississippi Offers 
‘Anything’ to Industry: Gov. Coleman Heads a Hunting Party of Seven Here, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 19, 1957, at 29.  John Dittmer provides evidence substantiating Coleman’s 
suspicion that the NAACP pressured black leaders to endorse integration the night before 
they were scheduled to meet Governor Hugh White in July 1954.  See JOHN DITTMER,
LOCAL PEOPLE: THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN MISSISSIPPI 38–39 (1994). 
 41. NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE AND POLITICS IN 
THE SOUTH DURING THE 1950S, at 126–49 (paperback ed. 1999). 
 42. Coleman reflected on his opposition to the Councils in a letter to a constituent 
in 1958. See Letter from J.P. Coleman to C.C. Smith, supra note 38. 
43. Mississippi: The Six-Foot Wedge, supra note 26, at 25. 
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without resorting to extremism.44  For example, Coleman noted that the 
Brown opinion substituted legal authority for “psychological and 
sociological” opinion and did not mention either how or when the South 
had to end segregation.45  This meant, Coleman argued, that the State of 
Mississippi could legally engage in a variety of measures to preserve 
segregation by manipulating “normal district boundaries” as well as 
assigning students to schools based on factors other than race, such as 
“health, aptitude . . . [and] intelligence.”46
Convinced that “outside meddlers” had put “a few colored children” 
up to challenging segregation in the South, Coleman argued that black 
students by and large did not want to give up “their own schools . . . 
their own associates . . . [and] their own teachers” simply for the chance 
to integrate with whites.47  Not only would such a move be challenged 
by “well-settled social rules” in Mississippi, he argued, but it would also 
mark an ill-considered rejection of substantive increases in black 
teachers’ salaries together with new, greatly improved black facilities in 
Mississippi.48  African-Americans of “good judgment,” contended Coleman, 
would not exchange “a bird in hand for nothing in the bush.”49
Coleman’s conviction that blacks lacked real commitment to 
integration contrasted starkly to the claims of many white extremists 
who argued vigorously that blacks were eager to integrate for the 
unlikely reason that they wanted to engage in interracial sex.50  Such 
claims, though preposterous, became the centerpiece of extremist 
positions like those held by Mississippi Circuit Judge Thomas Pickens 
Brady in 1954.  Brady popularized the view that integration would lead 
to “amalgamation” in a speech delivered to a group of white citizens in 
Greenwood, Mississippi, only a few weeks after Brown was decided.  
Lamenting the impact that integration would have on Southern society, 
Brady announced that black activists wanted to “get on the inter-
marriage turnpikes” in pursuit of a “social program for amalgamation of 
 44. Coleman, Meeting the School Crisis, supra note 27, at 4. 
45. Id. at 3–4. 
46. Id. at 6. 
47. Id. at 3, 7. 
48. Id. at 7–8. 
49. Id. at 8. 
 50. For more on fears regarding interracial sex, see Jane Dailey, The Theology of 
Massive Resistance: Sex, Segregation, and the Sacred after Brown, in MASSIVE RESISTANCE:
SOUTHERN OPPOSITION TO THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION 159–69 (Clive Webb ed., 
2005).
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the two races” that would “blow out the light in the white man’s 
brain.”51  Such claims, though absurd, played on longstanding fears of 
interracial sex in the South and inspired members of Brady’s audience to 
form the first Citizens’ Council in the summer of 1954.52
The Citizens’ Councils⎯a network of segregationist organizations 
that eschewed violence but embraced economic coercion and legal 
defiance⎯spread quickly through the South, forming the backbone of a 
larger political movement to reject Brown known as “massive resistance.”  
Massive resistance, a term coined by Virginia Senator Harry F. Byrd in 
1956, rested on the flawed assumption that the best method of opposing 
the Supreme Court was outright defiance.  This opposition drew dubious 
constitutional strength from a theory popularized by a Virginia newspaper 
editor named James Jackson Kilpatrick in a series of editorials in 
November 1955 called “interposition.”  First devised by James Madison 
and Thomas Jefferson in the 1790s, interposition held that individual 
states could substitute⎯or interpose⎯their own interpretations of 
constitutional law for those of the Supreme Court, thereby freeing them 
of any duty to obey legal rulings such as Brown.  Although such a 
position had motivated Southern leaders like John C. Calhoun during 
the first half of the nineteenth century⎯and arguably still inspired 
Southerners like Kilpatrick in the twentieth⎯interposition made little 
constitutional sense in 1955.  At best, it was a formal way of dressing 
groundless constitutional rebellion in legal language, useful mainly as a 
rhetorical tool for extremists to gain uninformed votes.53
To J.P. Coleman, massive resistance, and the extremists who 
supported it, posed just as much of a threat to preserving segregation as 
the “outside meddlers” who were pushing blacks to file ill-considered 
legal challenges to segregated schools.  So long as black activists and 
white extremists were allowed to operate freely, Coleman believed that 
they would jeopardize the South’s ability to preserve segregation.  On 
the other hand, if they could be kept in check, then the federal 
 51. TOM P. BRADY, BLACK MONDAY 64, 66 (1955); see also BARTLEY, supra note 
41, at 85. 
 52. BARTLEY, supra note 41, at 85.  For a first hand description of Brady, see 
JAMES GRAHAM COOK, THE SEGREGATIONISTS 13–33 (1962).  For an academic study of 
the Citizens’ Councils, see NEIL R. MCMILLEN, THE CITIZENS’ COUNCIL: ORGANIZED 
RESISTANCE TO THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION, 1954–64 (1971).  For a discussion of the 
ideological interplay between sex and segregation, see Dailey, supra note 50. 
 53. Although Kilpatrick popularized interposition in a series of editorials in the 
Richmond News Leader in November 1955, he was not the first Southerner to endorse it 
as a response to Brown.  BARTLEY, supra note 41, at 129.  That credit probably goes to a 
Virginia attorney named William Old, who published a pamphlet outlining it in August 
1955.  Id.  Some confused interposition and nullification.  See, e.g., Mississippi’s Leaders 
‘Divided’ on Proposal for Nullification, S. SCH. NEWS, Jan. 1956, at 6. 
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government could be kept out of Southern affairs, allowing the races 
time to separate themselves.  Even if some blacks refused to remain in 
their own schools, he believed that they could be thwarted quietly by 
redrawing school district boundaries or even by assigning students to 
schools according to factors that did not refer overtly to their color.54
Such legalist evasions⎯coupled with established racial norms⎯would 
effectively save segregation in the state. 
To drive home the damage that extremists could cause the South, 
Coleman worked hard to remind white voters in Mississippi that what 
the South faced in the 1950s was very much like what it had confronted 
in the 1870s.  Just like during Reconstruction’s “dark days,” he claimed 
on statewide television in 1954, the South’s way of life was being 
challenged by “individuals of whom not a one ever lived in our state.”55
This challenge had to be met with the same “determination” that ex-
Confederates, such as then-South Carolina Governor Wade Hampton, 
had exhibited during their opposition to Reconstruction following the 
Civil War.56  Though Hampton had relied on armed “rifle clubs” to 
disrupt Republican rallies in South Carolina, Coleman focused instead 
on Hampton’s loyal service to the South, proclaiming that he too was 
deeply committed to Southern traditions, arguably even more so than 
politically irresponsible proponents of massive resistance.57
Determined to avoid violent defiance, Coleman came into direct 
conflict with Tom P. Brady and James O. Eastland in December 1955, 
when Eastland and Brady joined Mississippi Congressman John Bell 
Williams in signing a resolution endorsing nullification of the Brown
ruling.58  Nullification, which lacked any real legal basis, closely mimicked 
interposition, the theory resurrected by Virginia newspaper editor James 
Jackson Kilpatrick. 
To Coleman, it was nonsense.  He told the Mississippi Legislature 
on December 15, 1955: 
You have probably noticed the manifestos freely issued in recent days by Judge 
Brady, Senator Eastland, and Congressman Williams, in which these men have 
advocated that the Legislature pass resolutions of nullification of the U.S. 
Supreme Court decision.  I am shocked and surprised by this proposal, because 
 54. Coleman, Meeting the School Crisis, supra note 27, at 6. 
55. Id. at 1–2. 
56. Id. at 8. 
 57. Ronald F. King, Counting the Votes: South Carolina’s Stolen Election of 1876,
32 J. INTERDISC. HIST. 169, 170 (2001). 
58. Mississippi’s Leaders ‘Divided’ on Proposal for Nullification, supra note 53. 
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history teaches in a long succession of events that such efforts have always 
failed, and in failing have brought down terrible penalties upon the heads of 
those who attempted it.59
To avoid such penalties, which Coleman’s study of Reconstruction made 
all too clear, the new Governor advocated calm.  “What I want to do,” 
Coleman told the state’s lawmakers, “is to preserve segregation in 
Mississippi.  I am not trying to grab headlines.”60
Coleman’s mention of grabbing headlines was suggestive.  Though 
leaders like Eastland, Williams, and Brady all proclaimed that interposition 
was the best possible response to the Supreme Court, it is possible⎯
indeed likely⎯that they too realized that it was constitutionally flimsy.  
After all, Brady was an experienced judge, and both Eastland and 
Williams were accomplished attorneys who had risen to the highest 
ranks of American government.  Their brazen endorsement of nullification 
may have had less to do with their belief that it would actually stop the 
Supreme Court and more with an instrumental belief that it could be 
used to rally white votes.  This was certainly true of Eastland and Williams, 
who had both relied on white voters to keep them in positions of power, 
and arguably Brady as well, who later confessed to his interest in 
running for governor.61
What led to such beliefs?  Why, for example, might leaders like 
Brady, Eastland, and Williams all come to think that extremism would 
win them votes, even though it had little chance of actually succeeding 
against the Supreme Court?  And how, if they were correct, did J.P. 
Coleman win the Governor’s race in 1955?  Perhaps the best answer is 
that popular support for defiance grew in direct relation to grassroots 
organizing by groups, such as the Citizens’ Councils, which expanded 
rapidly across the South from 1956 to 1959.  The Councils, aided by 
extreme segregationists like James Jackson Kilpatrick, endorsed a 
program of legal defiance⎯or massive resistance⎯that they then sold to 
legally unsophisticated voters as a more robust form of constitutionalism 
than Coleman’s placement schemes.  Indeed, prior to the rise of the 
Councils, Southern voters seemed relatively ambivalent about the best 
means of dealing with Brown.  That they overwhelmingly opposed the 
 59. Letter from J.P. Coleman, Governor, Miss., to the Members of the Miss. 
Legislature (Dec. 15, 1955) (on file with the Mississippi Department of Archives and 
History). 
60. Id.  To Coleman, the resolution was “legal poppycock.”  Phil Stroupe, 
Coleman Rejects Nullification Idea: Governor-Elect Disagrees with Eastland, Williams 
on Plan to Fight Decree, JACKSON DAILY NEWS, Dec. 14, 1955 (on file with the 
Mississippi Department of Archives and History); see also HODDING CARTER III, THE
SOUTH STRIKES BACK 58 (1959). 
 61. Brady confirmed rumors that he was interested in running for governor in a 
conversation with James Graham Cook.  See COOK, supra note 52, at 27.
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ruling is relatively certain, yet many voters seemed to have been at least 
open to the idea that other means of circumventing the Court existed 
besides just defiance.  This was certainly true in Mississippi, as Coleman’s 
victory attests, despite the fact that it was one of the South’s most 
conservative, racially divided states. 
Indeed, Coleman gained a certain amount of success by distinguishing 
himself from Brady, Eastland, and Williams⎯sometimes known as the 
“[L]ittle [T]hree”62⎯instead counseling legalist evasion as the best 
means of preserving the status quo.  Afraid that defiance would compromise 
Mississippi’s ability to keep black children out of white schools, for 
example, Coleman urged a state advisory committee to “pour cold water 
on any resolution coming before the new legislature for purposes of 
nullification of the Supreme Court decision.”63  Though Coleman derided 
Brady, Eastland, and Williams’s means, he did not oppose their ends.  “I 
don’t have one iota of fear,” he assured white Mississippians, “that we 
will not have segregation continued in this state.”64 He just did not 
believe that nullification was the way to do it. 
IV. M IS FOR MISSISSIPPI AND MURDER
To J.P. Coleman, the Little Three’s move towards nullification only 
worsened Mississippi’s reputation for racial extremism, an image 
exacerbated by the killing of Emmett Till in August 1955 along with a 
string of other murders earlier that year targeting civil rights activists.  
The first of these happened in May, when an African-American minister 
named George W. Lee was shot in his car while driving home through 
the small Delta town of Belzoni.65  Lee, a member of the NAACP, had 
been trying to register black voters in Humphreys County and had 
ignored white requests to refrain.66  Ike Shelton, the local sheriff, refused 
to charge anyone for the murder, stating that he could not tell whether 
the shotgun pellets in Lee’s face were bullets or lead fillings in his 
 62. Letter from Barron Drewry, U.S. Representative, Miss., to J.P. Coleman, 
Governor, Miss. (Dec. 15, 1955) (on file with the Mississippi Department of Archives 
and History). 
 63. Stroupe, supra note 60. 
64. Id.
65. See AARON HENRY WITH CONSTANCE CURRY, THE FIRE EVER BURNING 93
(2000) (describing Lee’s murder). 
66. Id.
WALKER_FINAL_ARTICLE[1] 7/8/2009 9:00:38 AM 
474
teeth.67  On August 13, an African-American named Lamar Smith was 
killed on the lawn outside Tom P. Brady’s courthouse in Brookhaven.68
Smith had also been active in trying to register black voters.  Even 
though local police had witnessed a white man covered in blood leaving 
the scene of the murder, they took days to arrest anyone.  When three 
men were finally brought before a grand jury, the jury refused to indict 
any of them, bolstering the impression that whites in Mississippi tolerated, 
if not approved of, the killing of black people in the state.69
Three weeks later, Emmett Till’s body was found.  This discovery, 
together with the shootings of Lee and Smith, inspired the NAACP to 
release a pamphlet entitled M Is for Mississippi and Murder that called 
for the federal government to intervene, ending the violence in 
Mississippi.70  To fuel the fire, high ranking officers in the NAACP made 
public statements decrying Mississippi’s violent record.  Roy Wilkins, 
the NAACP’s executive secretary, announced shortly after the Till killing: 
It would appear from this lynching that the state of Mississippi has decided to 
maintain white supremacy by murdering children.  The killers of the boy felt 
free to lynch him because there is in the entire state no restraining influence of 
decency, not in the state capital, among the daily newspapers, the clergy nor any 
segment of the so-called better citizens.71
Though something of an exaggeration, Roy Wilkins realized⎯just as 
J.P. Coleman did⎯that white violence could be used to draw federal 
intervention into the South.  In fact, two weeks after the Little Three 
signed their nullification resolution, Wilkins wrote to every NAACP 
branch in the country suggesting that they use the Till murder to lobby 
Congress into passing legislation authorizing federal intervention in the 
region.  “[P]lease write without further delay to both Senators from your 
state and to the Congressman from your district,” he urged NAACP 
branch leaders around the country, “reminding them of the Till murder 
and asking that this session of Congress pass civil rights bills to give the 
Department of Justice authority to act in such cases as the Till killing.”72
Wilkins’s strategy, which sought to use evidence of Southern atrocities 
to lobby directly for congressional intervention in the South, was 
remarkable.  Indeed, it suggests that at least some strategists in the early 
67. Id. at 93–94. 




70. Id. at 5–7. 
 71. THE LYNCHING OF EMMETT TILL: A DOCUMENTARY NARRATIVE, supra note 2,
at 19; see also M IS FOR MISSISSIPPI AND MURDER, supra note 68, at 5–7. 
 72. Letter from Roy Wilkins, Executive Sec’y, NAACP, to Branch Officers (Jan. 
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civil rights movement were thinking about using white violence to 
coerce Southern compliance long before the famed direct action campaigns 
in Birmingham and Selma, Alabama, in 1963 and 1965.  Though Wilkins 
certainly did not advocate direct action protest to provoke such violence, 
he undoubtedly saw how white extremism could help the black struggle.73
J.P. Coleman also recognized how extremism⎯particularly violence⎯
could help the black struggle.  In fact, as early as June 1955, Coleman 
warned constituents that “Congress might be inclined [to pass intrusive 
laws] to implement the desegregation decision” if the South chose to 
pursue defiance.74  Such an eventuality would be disastrous, argued 
Coleman, given Congress’s far-reaching powers over federal funding, 
interstate commerce, and the jurisdictional reach of federal agents.  
Conversely, he maintained that “all the Supreme Court can do is lay 
down a rule” from within the interpretation of a case, which did not lend 
itself to particularly aggressive enforcement.75
Roy Wilkins, perhaps even more than black legal strategists like 
Thurgood Marshall, recognized that Congress⎯not the Court⎯held the 
key to black freedom.  In fact, three weeks after the Little Three signed 
their interposition resolution, Wilkins sent Coleman a telegram requesting 
that he do more for racial justice in his state.  The inspiration behind the 
message was a magazine article by Alabama journalist William Bradford 
Huie recounting shocking confessions by J.W. Milam and Roy Bryant to 
the Emmett Till killing, making a mockery of Mississippi’s criminal 
justice system.76  Given “the admissions” of Roy Bryant and J.W. Milam, 
wrote Wilkins to Coleman, “the National Association for the Advancement 
of Colored People calls upon you to convene the grand jury of Le Flore 
County for the purpose of a new presentment of the kidnap charges against 
these self confessed criminals.”77  A new trial on the separate charge of 
kidnapping, not murder, Wilkins explained, would have far-reaching 
 73. David J. Garrow argues that movement strategists such as Martin Luther King, 
Jr., began to recognize the manner in which white extremists could help the movement 
after demonstrations in Albany, Georgia, in 1962.  See DAVID J. GARROW, PROTEST AT 
SELMA: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965, at 221–22 
(1978).
74. Mississippi, S. SCH. NEWS, June 8, 1955, at 18. 
75. Id.
 76. Huie, supra note 3.  Wilkins recognized that the Till murder could be used 
expressly to draw federal intervention into the region.  Letter from Roy Wilkins, supra
note 72. 
 77. Telegram from Roy Wilkins, Executive Sec’y, NAACP, to J.P. Coleman, Att’y 
Gen., Miss. (Jan. 9, 1956) (on file with the Library of Congress). 
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effects.  “If nothing is done to make them pay for at least one of their 
crimes,” lectured Wilkins, “our country will be held up for international 
ridicule.”78  That Wilkins mentioned international ridicule suggested 
that he was using international politics⎯backlit by the Cold War⎯as a 
means of pressuring Coleman into helping African-Americans. 
Did Coleman understand, much less fear, such a move?  It is almost 
certain that he did.  After all, he had confronted just such a threat while 
prosecuting Willie McGee in 1951⎯even receiving letters from officials 
as far away as China.79  Now, Wilkins seemed to be assuming the role of 
the CRC by focusing on Southern atrocities to try to force the South to 
change its racial politics.  To make matters worse, white extremists such 
as Milam and Bryant seemed to be going out of their way to disgrace the 
state, further convincing Coleman of the strategic value of moderation.  
During his inaugural address on January 17, 1956, Coleman alluded to 
M Is for Mississippi and Murder.  “Despite all the propaganda which has 
been fired at us,” declared the new Governor, “the count[r]y can be 
assured that the white people of Mississippi are not a race of Negro 
killers.”80  No doubt realizing that reporters from national newspapers 
like the New York Times and the Chicago Daily Tribune were present, 
Coleman specifically addressed audiences outside the state: “I would 
like you, our friends outside Mississippi, to know that the great 
overwhelming majority of the white people of Mississippi are not now 
guilty and never intend to be guilty of any murder, violence, or any other 
wrong-doing toward anyone.”81  Coleman then turned to address his 
constituents and warned, “We must keep cool heads and calm judgment 
in the face of all the provocation which is being hurled upon us.”82  He 
continued, “[W]hile there is no magic remedy for the Supreme Court 
decision[,] there are multiplied means and methods, all perfectly legal, 
by which we can and will defeat integration of the races in our state.”83
Coleman’s allusion to “multiplied means and methods, all perfectly 
legal” stood in stark contrast to Brady, Eastland, and Williams’s declaration 
of nullification, and even to his own pressured endorsement of 
interposition.  It was a call for evasion⎯not extremism⎯and it illustrated 
78. Id.
79. Chinese Reds Protest McGee Case to Truman, supra note 37. 
 80. Governor J.P. Coleman, Inaugural Address in Jackson, Miss. (Jan. 17, 1955), 
in ST. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1956, at 15A (on file with the Mississippi Department of Archives 
and History) [hereinafter Coleman, Inaugural Address]. 
81. Id.  Just as Coleman suspected, his speech was covered by major newspapers 
like the N.Y. Times and Chicago Daily Tribune. Gov. Coleman Takes Post in Mississippi,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1956, at 14; Vows to Retain Segregation in Mississippi: But Without 
Violence, New Governor Says, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Jan. 18, 1956, at A8. 
 82. Coleman, Inaugural Address, supra note 80. 
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Coleman’s conviction that the best way of preventing integration was 
through legalist means. 
Roy Wilkins took issue with Coleman’s suggestion that he and 
activists like him were using white atrocities to force political change, 
even mentioning “outside interference.”84  Outraged that Coleman would 
try to pin racial unrest on “interference” by civil rights groups, Wilkins 
wrote the new governor to inquire about the murder of an African-
American named Clinton Melton on December 3, 1955, in Glendora, 
Mississippi.85  According to Wilkins, the NAACP had purposely not 
intervened in the case precisely because it had hoped that Mississippi 
authorities might prosecute the killer, Elmore Otis Kimbell, who had 
been identified by three witnesses.86  Despite the absence of such 
NAACP “interference,” however, an all white jury still refused to 
convict.87  To Wilkins, this meant that Mississippi was “unwilling to 
administer justice” in cases in which African-Americans were killed by 
whites, thereby validating the NAACP’s push for “[f]ederal intervention 
to uphold justice.”88
Rather than respond directly to Wilkins’s threat, Coleman chose a 
more evasive tactic, actively discouraging civil rights activists such as 
the NAACP leader from visiting Mississippi.  For example, on April 27, 
1956, Coleman wired Adam Clayton Powell, a prominent black congressman 
from New York, and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., an increasingly prominent 
black minister in Montgomery, Alabama, requesting that they stay out 
of the state.89  Citing his “duty” as Governor of Mississippi, Coleman 
alerted both men to the fact that conditions in Mississippi were “more 
tranquil than at any time in recent months” and that their appearance in 
the state would be “a great disservice to our Negro people.”90  In a 
prepared statement issued to the public, Coleman went even further, 
calling both King and Powell “professional agitators” akin to the 
 84. Letter from Roy Wilkins, Sec’y, NAACP, to J.P. Coleman, Governor, Miss. 
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“carpetbaggers” and “scalawags” who corrupted Southern politics after 
the Civil War.91  Both had been invited to speak at a meeting in Jackson 
sponsored by an organization called the Regional Council of Negro 
Leadership (RCNL).92  King, in particular, worried Coleman due to his 
charismatic leadership of a massive bus boycott in Montgomery that had 
begun in December 1955 and that was still in full swing during the 
spring of 1956.  Seeing the avalanche of negative press that the boycott 
had generated for Alabama authorities, not to mention the greater 
outpouring of sympathy that it had generated for the black struggle, 
Coleman recognized that a similar conflagration in Mississippi might 
compromise his plans for peaceful evasion of Brown.  Interestingly, both 
King and Powell complied with Coleman’s request, asserting that they 
had never planned to take up the RCNL’s invitation anyway.93  Although 
this might have been true, the RCNL still chafed at the Governor’s move 
and attacked him for trying to project a façade of tranquility in the state.  
“[T]he effort being put forth by Governor J.P.[] Coleman to give the 
outside world the impression that there is a tranquil state of race 
relations in Mississippi” must be challenged, lamented the RCNL at its 
annual meeting in Jackson in April.  “[A]s long as the 986,000 Negroes 
in Mississippi are denied their God given American rights in the field of 
Education, voting and justice, there will be no tranquil era in 
Mississippi.”94
J.P. Coleman sought to prove otherwise.  To bolster an image of tranquility 
in Mississippi, he called for measures far beyond polite requests that 
civil rights activists stay home.  Among these were innovations in the 
state’s law enforcement and criminal justice system.  During his inaugural 
address, for example, he promised that “the full weight of the government 
will unfailingly be used to the end that Mississippi will be a State of law 
and not of violence.”95  Acknowledging the negative implications of 
poor law enforcement like that demonstrated by the sheriffs in Belzoni 
and Brookhaven, Coleman admonished those in positions of power to 
conduct government on “a high plane of service, economy, and stability.”96
High enough, he continued, to “leave no doubt” that Mississippi was “an 
91. Id.
92. Id.  Coleman probably did not know that tension existed between the RCNL 
and the NAACP.  For evidence, see Letter from Medgar W. Evers, Field Sec’y, NAACP, 
to Roy Wilkins, Executive Sec’y, NAACP (Apr. 10, 1956) (on file with the Library of 
Congress).
93. Coleman Asks Powell to Postpone, supra note 89.  Medgar Evers believed that 
Powell had actually confirmed attendance at the RCNL meeting.  See Letter from Medgar W. 
Evers, supra note 92. 
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outstanding, safe place” where outside investors would feel comfortable 
“to locate and operate” and where all citizens would receive “fair and 
equitable treatment under fair and just laws.”97  It was a big promise, one 
that sought to reassure the nation that Mississippi was in fact committed 
to peace through the centralization of law enforcement.  Coleman knew, 
for example, that one of the weakest links in Mississippi’s law 
enforcement machinery was the local discretion of elected sheriffs who 
had little interest in presenting a moderate image to the nation or to the 
world⎯particularly when such an image did not help them in local 
reelection campaigns. 
V. CENTRALIZING LAW ENFORCEMENT
Convinced that Mississippi needed to reign in violence and to bolster 
lawfulness, Coleman made reforming the state’s criminal justice system 
a central part of his administration.  For example, he announced 
during his inaugural address, “I shall at the first appropriate opportunity 
deliver a special message to the Legislature on the necessity of strengthening 
and improving all phases of our law enforcement machinery.”98  Up to 
that point, Mississippi’s law enforcement machinery had been controlled 
largely at the local level, which gave the state little power to prevent the 
type of local defiance dramatized in M Is for Mississippi and Murder.
To ameliorate this, Coleman advocated for several limitations on local 
power.  One was an unprecedented procedure through which locally 
appointed authorities and police could be recalled by popular vote.99
Under Coleman’s proposed bill, thirty percent of the voters of any 
county could request by petition a recall election of a county official, 
while fifty-one percent could recall a police officer.100  Once such a 
recall petition was made, a governor-appointed chancery court would 
decide whether the official or police officer should remain in office.101
By allowing the state to take a hand in local law enforcement, the bill 
97. Id.
98. Id.
 99. Douglas Starr, New Law in Effect: Recall Bill Signed by Governor Coleman,
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defied what one newspaper called Mississippi’s traditional “hands off 
policy when it came to ‘interferring’ [sic] in local affairs.”102
To further control local affairs, Coleman increased state regulation of 
local justices of the peace (JPs). Such justices, elected by county, 
handled the vast majority of criminal cases in Mississippi at the time, yet 
often possessed little or no legal training.  They became notorious in 
Mississippi for charging exorbitant court fees, as well as unreasonable 
fines for traffic violations and other petty crimes.103  Part of this stemmed 
from the fact that they were paid a percentage of the fees that they 
charged, an arrangement inviting corruption.  Coleman made it a goal of 
his administration to end this corruption and to modernize the JP system.  
In 1956, the Governor declared, “Justices of the peace who want to 
do right have no need to fear, but if JP’s resist efforts to improve and 
modernize their offices, it could result in abolition of the JP court 
system, and they will have brought it upon themselves.”104
To further limit local autonomy and to centralize power, Coleman 
strengthened the state highway patrol.  Because state troopers answered 
directly to him, they provided Coleman with a law enforcement mechanism 
capable of overriding local sheriffs and intervening in local affairs.  To 
expand state troopers’ power, Coleman initiated a “substantial reorganization” 
of the patrol as well as an overall increase in its numbers.105  To fund 
this increase, he recommended and succeeded in obtaining increases in 
both tag and drivers’ license fees throughout the state.106  As he explained 
many years later, his changes in the highway patrol would have direct 
implications for the relationship between Jackson and other parts of the 
state, particularly the Delta, which was the Citizens’ Councils’ headquarters.  
“For years and years,” explained Coleman later, “the Mississippi Delta . . . 
was a fiefdom of its own.  They didn’t want anybody messing with their 
business; they ran their own affairs . . . and they just wouldn’t permit 
102. Miss. Legislature Meets with Segregation as Major Issue, ATLANTA J., Jan. 4, 
1956, at A1. 
 103. During a speech before the legislature in 1958, Coleman called for the fixing 
of fees chargeable by the justices of the peace: “I hope you will pass a statute clearly 
fixing the fees of the justice-of-the-peace and putting a stop to the cost racket which has 
given us so much unfavorable and undeserved publicity.”  Phil Stroupe, JP Fines Curbed 
by House Action: Measure Boosted by Coleman Aims to Kill Off Speed Traps, JACKSON 
DAILY NEWS, Apr. 1, 1958, at 1. 
 104. Phil Stroupe, Coleman Says New Constitution Needed in State, JACKSON DAILY 
NEWS, Nov. 27, 1956 (on file with the Mississippi Department of Archives and History). 
 105. Frederick Sullens, Governor Will Be Slow in Dispensing Patronage, JACKSON
DAILY NEWS, Apr. 2, 1956 (on file with the Mississippi Department of Archives and 
History). 
 106. Letter from J.P. Coleman, Governor, Miss., to Miss. Legislature (Feb. 20, 1956) 
(on file with the Mississippi Department of Archives and History). 
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any—they wouldn’t even talk about having—state police.”107  The Delta’s 
aversion to state police stemmed from a remarkable state tradition of 
localism in law enforcement.  Though troopers had long existed in 
Mississippi, they lacked general jurisdiction and were limited largely to 
patrolling highways.  This meant that local law enforcement officers, 
particularly sheriffs, possessed almost complete autonomy in their 
counties, a situation that led to a type of decentralized law enforcement 
in which local police could essentially decide what laws to enforce and 
what to ignore.  Because state troopers worked for the Governor, any 
expansion in their jurisdiction or size meant a potential threat to this 
arrangement because they might be sent to rural counties to enforce state 
laws independent of local approval.  This threat was exacerbated by the 
fact that many sheriffs made considerable amounts of money by 
agreeing to turn a blind eye to criminal activity, particularly violations of 
the state’s prohibition against alcohol⎯a practice with which they did 
not want state troopers to interfere.  To limit outside intervention and to 
preserve their own autonomy, Mississippi sheriffs lobbied heavily in the 
state house and senate, both forums in which they had hoped to resist 
any centralization of law enforcement statewide.108
Though omnipotent at home, rural sheriffs proved ineffectual in the 
state capital.  Fears stirred by Brown seemed to temporarily override 
Mississippi’s law enforcement localism, creating a situation in which 
state legislators proved willing to enact Coleman’s laws augmenting the 
authority of state police.  This, of course, suggests that Brown did not 
just incite extremism, but galvanized Southern state lawmaking, uniting 
legislators around the central goal of preserving segregation.  For a 
Southern governor with a strategic sensibility like Coleman, this created 
a window of opportunity to present aggressive packages of legislation 
that were then accepted with relatively little resistance.  Though legislators 
still made the law, of course, Brown enabled Coleman to exercise a 
remarkable degree of political leadership over the legislative process.109
 107. INTERVIEW OF J.P. COLEMAN, supra note 20, at 86. 
 108. For more on law enforcement in Mississippi in the 1950s, see ROBERT B.
HIGHSAW & CHARLES N. FORTENBERRY, THE GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF 
MISSISSIPPI 160–73 (1954).  For more on the tension between sheriffs and state troopers, 
see V.O. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION 235 (1949). See also
Weldon Cooper, The State Police Movement in the South, 1 J. POL. 414, 414–33 (1939). 
 109. For a more detailed analysis of Brown’s impact on executive power in the 
South, see Coleman B. Ransone, Jr., Political Leadership in the Governor’s Office, 26 J.
POL. 197, 213–18 (1964); Gladwin Hill, Mississippi, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1956, at 21. 
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Enhancing the reach of Mississippi’s state troopers was not the only 
part of Coleman’s plan that he pushed through the state’s legislative 
process.  In fact, the most remarkable measure that he endorsed was the 
creation of a state agency called the Mississippi Sovereignty Commission.  
The Sovereignty Commission, established by statute in 1956, was an 
executive agency charged with using “any lawful, peaceful and constitutional 
means” to prevent implementation of Brown.110  It possessed police 
powers as well as adjudicatory capabilities.  For example, members of 
the Sovereignty Commission could subpoena witnesses and also require 
production of private “books, records, papers and documents.”111  Refusal 
to produce such evidence could result in imprisonment.  Similarly, the 
Commission had the power to use the Hinds County Chancery Court in 
Jackson to enforce obedience to any process that it had issued, and it was 
further granted broad investigatory powers to look into the records of 
individuals, corporate entities, and political groups.112 Finally, the 
Sovereignty Commission could expend any amount of its budget on 
advertising, presumably to create and distribute propaganda to improve 
Mississippi’s image nationally.113
Impressive in scope, the Sovereignty Commission became an integral 
part of Coleman’s strategy for maintaining segregation⎯and tranquility⎯in 
Mississippi.  Interestingly, it helped him to control both civil rights 
activists and white extremists.  In the spring of 1958, for example, the 
Commission became actively involved in thwarting a Citizens’ Council 
attempt to have NAACP officers Medgar Evers and Roy Wilkins 
arrested.  On the afternoon of May 17, 1959, Evers, the head of the 
NAACP’s Mississippi branch, and Wilkins, visiting from New York, 
were scheduled to speak at a black Masonic Lodge in Jackson.  The 
speeches had been planned months in advance as part of a larger attempt 
to rally black support for civil rights in the state.  Prior to the 
commencement of the speech, Attorney General Joseph T. Patterson and 
Zack Van Landingham, a Sovereignty Commission investigator, drove 
110. Mississippi Sets Up ‘Watch-Dog’ Group on Race Problems, S. SCH. NEWS,
Apr. 1956, at 10. 
 111. 1956 Miss. Laws 521–24. 
112. Id. at 521–22.
113. Id. at 523.  Coleman called for “an appropriate State Sovereignty bill to enable 
the state during next two years to maintain a successful fight for preserving separation of 
races.”  Painful Warning: Coleman Tells Legislature State Budget out of Line, JACKSON 
DAILY NEWS, Mar. 20, 1956 (on file with the Mississippi Department of Archives and 
History).  For an excellent institutional history of the Mississippi State Sovereignty 
Commission, see YASUHIRO KATAGIRI, THE MISSISSIPPI STATE SOVEREIGNTY COMMISSION:
CIVIL RIGHTS AND STATES’ RIGHTS (2001).
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to the Lodge “to observe just what appeared to be going on.”114  Once 
there, the Jackson Police Department’s Chief of Detectives Meady 
Pierce approached them, complaining that the Citizens’ Councils had 
attempted to sabotage the meeting, “You know what some damn fools 
have done?  They have gone and gotten out warrants for Roy Wilkins and 
Medgar Evers.”115
Upon investigation, Patterson and Van Landingham discovered that 
the Citizens’ Councils, convinced that “Governor Coleman and State 
authorities were afraid of Roy Wilkins and Medgar Evers,” had obtained 
warrants from a sympathetic justice of the peace to arrest the two civil 
rights leaders.116  In an effort to derail the Councils’ strategy, Attorney 
General Patterson contacted Dick King, a high-ranking Council official, 
and warned him that arresting the two high-profile civil rights leaders 
would not aid the cause of white supremacy in the state.  Patterson 
warned that “it would be a grave mistake to arrest Wilkins and Evers 
because of the national publicity that would follow.”117  Van Landingham 
then contacted Louis Hollis, Director of the Mississippi Citizens’ 
Council, warning him that the arrests would be bad for Mississippi.  
While Governor Coleman hurried back to Jackson from a graduation 
speech in Goodman to deal with the crisis, Hollis followed Van 
Landingham’s advice, contacted other influential Council members in 
the state, and conveyed to them his discussion with the Sovereignty 
Commission.  By the time of the scheduled speeches, the Councils had 
withdrawn their warrants.118
Not only did Coleman’s Sovereignty Commission control white 
extremists, it also curtailed civil rights activists.  One method that the 
Commission deployed to do this was police surveillance.  To take just 
one example, almost one year before the Sovereignty Commission saved 
Medgar Evers from arrest, the Commission began tracking his movements 
around the state.  “At the meeting of the State Sovereignty Commission 
on November 20, 1958,” read the minutes of one Sovereignty Commission 
meeting, “Governor Coleman suggested that spot checks be made of the 
activities of Medgar Evers, both day and night, to determine whether he 
 114. Letter from Zack J. Van Landingham to Dir., State Sovereignty Comm’n 1 
(May 18, 1959) (on file with the Mississippi Department of Archives and History). 
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1, 3. 
117. Id. at 2. 
118. Id. at 3. 
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is violating any laws.”119 That Coleman ordered the Sovereignty 
Commission to ensnare Medgar Evers in the violation of petty laws yet 
shied away from his outright arrest at a public speech appears, on the 
surface, to be paradoxical.  Yet, it hints at the deeper logic behind J.P. 
Coleman’s larger civil rights strategy.  Afraid of appearing to be a racial 
extremist, he had no qualms about appearing tough on law enforcement, 
particularly if such enforcement happened to ensnare civil rights 
activists.
Coleman ordered a particularly bold display of law enforcement 
power in June 1958, when an African-American named Clennon King 
tried to enroll in summer school at the University of Mississippi.120
Although King, a thirty-seven-year-old former professor, had little 
trouble entering campus, he encountered problems when he joined the 
line to register.  Robert Ellis, a university registrar, invited King to his 
office and promptly asked him to leave.  King refused, only to find state 
troopers waiting for him inside.  The officers arrested him, carried him 
bodily to a waiting car, and then drove him to headquarters where Public 
Safety Commissioner Tom Scarborough⎯at Coleman’s request⎯ordered 
King examined by psychiatrists.121  Based on the examination, a state 
judge ordered King committed to a state mental hospital.  Governor 
Coleman, who orchestrated King’s commitment, later told a press 
conference that the activist would either be confined to a mental hospital 
or tried for resisting arrest and disturbing the peace.122
Coleman’s neutralization of Clennon King showcased his penchant for 
shrewd state action.  Although King clearly had no mental problems, his 
quick examination and commitment precluded events from escalating to 
a riot as they did at Ole Miss four years later.  Of course, King’s story 
still made it into Northern newspapers like the New York Times, but it 
failed to make the first page.123  Coleman, through his deft handling of 
state police and Sovereignty Commission agents, displayed a knack for 
quietly defusing black protest.  Interestingly, he would refine this ability 
even more as his agents undertook the manipulation of black leaders 
themselves to help prevent integration in Mississippi. 
 119. Memorandum from the State Sovereignty Comm’n, Subject: Medgar Evers, 
Race Agitator (Nov. 25, 1958) (on file with the Mississippi Department of Archives and 
History). 
120. Mississippi Police Seize Negro Seeking to Enroll at University, N.Y. TIMES,
June 6, 1958, at 25. 
121. Id.
122. Negro Committed for Mental Tests: Mississippi Holds Man Who Tried to Enter 
College—Lawyer is Ejected, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1958, at 10. 
123. Id.
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VI. RECRUITING BLACK INFORMANTS
On May 15, 1956, Coleman declared that it was time for the 
Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission to bring itself into “full effect 
and fruition” by taking two final steps towards expanding its power.124
Specifically, the Commission decided to allocate state funds to “buy 
information” from civil rights activists and, concomitantly, to hire black 
secret agents to serve as the Commission’s “eyes and ears” in African-
American communities.125  In addition to tracking civil rights activists 
such as Medgar Evers through conventional police tactics, the Sovereignty 
Commission also sought black agents to guide it through black political 
networks that were otherwise hidden from white view.  These agents 
were usually older, middle class African-Americans who held prestigious 
positions in black colleges and schools and feared, correctly, that 
integration could lead them to lose their jobs.  Once on the Sovereignty 
Commission’s payroll, they performed a variety of tasks, such as reporting 
civil rights activities in their communities as well as intervening directly 
to defuse civil rights protests.126
For example, on December 10, 1957, the Sovereignty Commission’s 
Public Relations Director Hall DeCell reported to Governor Coleman on 
a meeting in Clarksdale of the Regional Council of Negro Leadership, 
the same group that had invited Martin Luther King, Jr., and Adam 
Clayton Powell to Jackson in 1956.  Referring to black informers that 
the Commission employed, DeCell asserted that “[w]e had the meeting 
well covered with some of our Negro friends and will have by the latter 
part of this week, a complete typewritten report on what went on.”127
That Coleman was getting typewritten reports of RCNL meetings was 
remarkable.  The RCNL, unlike the NAACP, was a relatively isolated, 
local organization. That the Governor was reading their minutes suggests 
124. Segregation Unit Votes Spy Set-Up: Mississippi Will Hire Secret Agents to 
Report Moves in Integration Camp, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1956, at 28. 
125. Id.
 126. Katagiri discusses these informers extensively in his study. See KATAGIRI,
supra note 113, at 36–63.
 127. Letter from Hal C. DeCell to Governor Coleman, Miss., Clarksdale Meeting of 
Regional Council of Negro Leadership (Dec. 10, 1957) (on file with the Mississippi 
Department of Archives and History).  Both John Dittmer and Charles Payne discuss the 
RCNL. See DITTMER, supra note 40, at 32–33; CHARLES M. PAYNE, I’VE GOT THE LIGHT 
OF FREEDOM: THE ORGANIZING TRADITION AND THE MISSISSIPPI FREEDOM STRUGGLE 31–
32 (1995).  Aaron Henry called the organization a “homegrown NAACP.”  DITTMER,
supra note 40, at 33. 
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a relatively high level of both state surveillance, and intrusion, into black 
affairs.  It also helps to explain how Coleman knew, for example, that 
Martin Luther King, Jr., and Adam Clayton Powell were scheduled to 
speak in Jackson, prompting a hasty move by the Governor to contact 
each leader and dissuade them from visiting the state. 
Although legal segregation kept the races apart, Coleman’s Sovereignty 
Commission enabled him to get inside black civil rights circles.  Further, 
the type of information furnished by the Commission helped give 
Coleman a sense of what parts of the state might need particular 
attention.  In August 1956, for example, Coleman received assurance 
from a Sovereignty Commission agent named William Liston that 
whites in Yazoo City were working together with black agents to quell 
civil rights activity independently of state help.  Liston noted that one 
black agent named Fred W. Young had called a “meeting of all the 
[N]egro teachers” in Yazoo City and had warned them that “the fastest 
way for them to lose the proposed new [N]egro schools would be for 
them to engage in N.A.A.C.P. activities.”128  That African-Americans 
were being offered new schools, and that black agents were being used 
to sell such schools, helps explain the extent to which Coleman endorsed 
a moderate approach to resisting Brown, one that rewarded at the same 
time that it pressured blacks. 
Although Coleman’s willingness to fund black schools was clearly 
designed to forestall integration, it was also indicative of a larger, 
perhaps unexpected, effect of Brown.  As much as Brown seemed to pit 
the races against each other, for example, it also brought moderates of 
both races closer together, usually by encouraging them to meet and 
forge compromises.129 For example, white moderates throughout Mississippi 
worked hard to form interracial organizations or committees precisely so 
that black and white leaders could sit down and negotiate deals in lieu of 
integrating.  One such committee in Mississippi drew attention to itself 
in the summer of 1956, for example, when Liston reported on civil rights 
in Vicksburg.  According to him, an “inter-racial Committee on Race 
Relations . . . composed of outstanding and rational members of both 
races” had worked successfully through negotiation and mediation to “control 
the extremists on both sides.”130  One member of said committee, J.H. 
 128. Confidential Report from William Liston, Investigator, State Sovereignty 
Comm’n, to J.P. Coleman, Governor, Miss. (Aug. 1–2, 1956) (on file with the Mississippi 
Department of Archives and History). 
 129. David L. Chappell goes one step further, arguing that moderates provided civil 
rights activists with leverage, enabling them to win important concessions. See DAVID L.
CHAPPELL, INSIDE AGITATORS: WHITE SOUTHERNERS IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT
192 (1994). 
 130. Confidential Report from William Liston, supra note 128. 
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White, gained particular praise from Liston for his openness to negotiating 
with whites, a willingness that might have stemmed from the fact that he 
was also a professor at the then all-black Mississippi Vocational 
College.131
To Roy Wilkins, over a thousand miles away in New York, such black 
cooperation was lamentable.  During a speech on June 3, 1956, Wilkins 
exclaimed, “Over in Soviet Russia . . . they had a system of paying 
children to spy on their parents.”132  In his opinion, Mississippi was now 
doing the same thing: “Spies will tell who smiled at a Negro yesterday, 
or what Negro said he was sick of Jim Crow, or what tired Negro 
woman said she wished she did not have to stand up while white men sat 
in the bus.”133  Although black collaboration clearly bothered Wilkins, 
there was not much that he could do to stop it.  In fact, some NAACP 
members in Mississippi even pressured him, threatening to switch sides 
and to work for whites if he did not comply with their demands.  One 
such mercenary was Gus Courts, a black activist who had been shot by a 
white racist in his own grocery store in Belzoni, Mississippi, in 1955.134
Unable to find work, Courts accepted money from the NAACP in 
exchange for delivering speeches and testifying in favor of civil rights 
legislation in Congress.  By April 1957, however, that money had begun 
to run out, prompting Courts to ask Wilkins for more.  Aware of his 
potential value to segregationists, Courts threatened Wilkins that if the 
NAACP did not send him $1500 for a new store, he would switch sides 
and work for J.P. Coleman.  “Must I go back to Mississippi, denounce 
the N.A.A.C.P. and accept the offers of the South?” Courts wrote 
Wilkins; “I could have avoided all of this by accepting the offers of the 
Southern Whites but I chose to stand by the N.A.A.C.P. and its program 
upon its promises.”135  Courts, perhaps because he was the victim of a 
relatively sensational crime, proved too valuable a spokesperson for the 
NAACP to lose.  Wilkins sent him the money a week later.136
131. Id.
132. Mississippians Urged to Solve Race Issue Through Honest Discussion, NEWS 
FROM NAACP (NAACP, New York, N.Y.), June 3, 1956 (on file with the Library of 
Congress).
133. Id.
134. See infra note 149 and accompanying text. 
 135. Letter from Gus Courts to Roy Wilkins, Executive Sec’y, NAACP (Apr. 18, 
1957) (on file with the Library of Congress). 
136. See Letter from Roy Wilkins, Executive Sec’y, NAACP, to Gus Courts (Apr. 
26, 1957) (on file with the Library of Congress). 
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Roy Wilkins’s willingness to pay Gus Courts cash in exchange for 
making speeches against white Southerners indicated the depth of his 
commitment to winning a constitutional struggle against the Mississippi 
Sovereignty Commission and J.P. Coleman on a playing field far 
removed from the federal courts.  Though NAACP lawyers such as 
Thurgood Marshall certainly became better known as crusaders for 
Brown, Wilkins was still very much involved in the fight, albeit in a 
more subtle type of propaganda struggle that involved the manipulation 
of hearts and minds.  The goal of this struggle was to build popular 
support, and ultimately congressional and executive resolve, for coercing 
compliance with Brown in the South.  The primary opponents of the 
NAACP in this struggle were Southern moderates like Coleman, not 
white extremists like Eastland or Brady.  If anything, Eastland and Brady 
only helped the NAACP by discrediting the South with their absurd 
declarations of defiance against the Supreme Court, coupled with 
their ridiculous claims that integration would lead to mongrelization and 
civilizational collapse.  Rather than fear them, NAACP agents sought to 
actually increase the illusion of their influence.  On April 29, 1956, for 
example, A.M. Mackel, an NAACP member from Natchez, Mississippi, 
wrote a letter to Roy Wilkins suggesting that they infiltrate the Citizens’ 
Councils with agents appearing to be white extremists. “A friend of 
mine,” wrote Mackel, “said we should infiltrate the Councils with the 
same type of propaganda they are putting on us.”137  Interestingly, Mackel 
suggested that the infiltrators pretend they were outspoken extremists, 
damaging the Councils’ image by making “a few ‘[H]itler’ speeches.”138
Though such proposals were not acted on, the manner in which they 
emerged reveals the extent to which the battle over Brown bled into 
ideological terrain.  Long before young black activists in the Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference or the Congress of Racial Equality 
used direct action to win hearts and minds nationally, NAACP leaders 
used other tactics, such as the payment of black agents like Mackel and 
Courts, to achieve a similar end. 
To the chagrin of the NAACP, established black leaders often refused 
to cooperate with NAACP plans, even petitioning to work for Coleman’s 
administration.  On November 13, 1958, for example, a black school 
supervisor named B.L. Bell wrote to Governor Coleman, requesting 
employment with the Sovereignty Commission.139  Coleman ordered the 
 137. Letter from A.M. Mackel to Roy Wilkins, Executive Sec’y, NAACP (Apr. 29, 
1956) (on file with the Library of Congress). 
138. Id.
 139. Memorandum from Zack J. Van Landingham to J.P. Coleman, Governor, 
Miss. 1 (Jan. 12, 1959) (on file with the Mississippi Department of Archives and 
History). 
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Commission to conduct an investigation of Bell to determine his reliability 
and influence.  This process included an interview, during which Bell 
“furnished considerable information and names of individuals in Bolivar 
County whom he stated were members of the NAACP.”140  After 
conducting his investigation, a white Sovereignty Commission agent 
concluded that hiring Bell “has some merit.”141  He recommended paying 
Bell “$50 a month for a period of 3 months,” noting that during this 
time Bell could monitor civil rights activity in the state, and then 
“furnish any worthwhile information” to the Commission.142
Political pragmatism, coupled with economic incentives, accounted 
for much of the Sovereignty Commission’s success in attracting black 
agents.  Informants sought money or services in exchange for cooperation.  
A dramatic example of this occurred when a black man named Clyde 
Kennard applied for admission to Mississippi Southern, an all-white 
college in Hattiesburg.  Kennard, a former paratrooper, applied to enter 
the school in the fall of 1959.143  The Sovereignty Commission devised a 
variety of plans to thwart him, none involving dramatic confrontations or 
violence.  One such plan was a full-scale investigation of Kennard’s 
past, including anything that could be used to disqualify him, including 
bad credit, bad moral character, and criminal violations.  In pursuit of 
this end, the Commission deployed investigators to search through 
Kennard’s past work record, his past school records, and even vital 
statistics on his parents’ marriage.144
The Commission also recruited a taskforce of black ministers and 
educators to discourage Kennard from submitting his application.  As 
one Commission investigator wrote: 
140. Id.  Other black leaders who joined Bell included: W.A. Higgins, a school 
teacher in Clarksdale, Mississippi; B.F. McLaurin, a principal of an all-black junior 
college in Clarksdale, Mississippi; Dr. J.H. White in Itta Bena, Mississippi; Professor 
N.H. Burger, a school principal in Hattiesburg, Mississippi; Dr. Lee Owens, a medical 
doctor in Vicksburg, Mississippi; E.S. Bishop, a professor at an all-black school in 
Corinth, Mississippi; and Fred Miller of Mound Bayou, Mississippi.  Id. at 2–3. 
141. Id. at 3. 
142. Id.
 143. Charles Payne mentions Kennard’s case as one of the most frustrating that 
Medgar Evers faced in Mississippi.  PAYNE, supra note 127, at 55. 
 144. Investigative Report by Zack J. Van Landingham on Clyde Kennard: Integration 
Agitator; Attempt to Integrate Mississippi Southern College 13–21 (Dec. 17, 1958) (on 
file with the Mississippi Department of Archives and History).  “Subject is living with 
mother and stepfather.  (Mother and stepfather may be common law man and wife since 
extensive investigation revealed no marriage license issued to Silas L. Smith or Leonia 
Kennard or Kinnard), at Route 1, (Eatonville, Hattiesburg, Mississippi).”  Id. at 13. 
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It was suggested to these individuals that since they were leaders of their race in 
the community and since they were in favor of maintaining segregated schools, 
that it might serve a useful purpose if they would constitute themselves as a 
committee to call on Clyde Kennard and persuade him that it was for the best 
interest of all concerned that he withdraw and desist from filing an application 
for admission to Mississippi Southern College.145
In exchange for their betrayal of Kennard, the black ministers and 
educators gave the Sovereignty Commission an implicit list of demands, 
not least of which was the construction of an all-black junior college in 
Hattiesburg.  The Sovereignty Commission report continued that “[i]t is 
interesting to note, however, that all three of the [N]egro educators when 
interviewed on separate occasions, brought into the conversation their 
need for a Negro Junior College in [Hattiesburg]. The inference was 
inescapable that they were attempting to bargain in a subtle manner.”146
One of the more skillful bargainers was J.H. White, the same 
individual who had been recommended to the Commission for helping 
subvert civil rights in Vicksburg. To avert a crisis at Mississippi Southern, 
White suggested that the Sovereignty Commission order the college’s 
president, Dr. McCain, to find some way of bringing Kennard to Jackson 
where, by apparent accident, he could run into Governor Coleman.  An 
impromptu meeting with Coleman, argued White, would appease 
Kennard—who, according to White, only wanted attention—especially if 
the Governor promised an all-black college in Hattiesburg.147
J.H. White’s not-so-subtle insistence on a black college in Hattiesburg 
provides a glimpse into the type of real politik that permeated race 
relations in Mississippi in the 1950s.  Rather than unsuspecting Uncle 
Toms, the black employees of the Sovereignty Commission banked on 
the hope that by aligning themselves with the state, they could preserve 
their jobs as well as gain benefits for both themselves and the black 
community.  To many of them, the NAACP was an alien, arguably even 
reckless, organization.  Not only did it risk provoking a white crackdown, 
but it also represented a challenge to local black power.  Instead of 
embracing the civil rights organization, at least some black leaders opted 
to go around it by engaging in accommodation with white authorities. 
145. Id. at 34.  “All of these Negroes agreed that this was a desirable solution and 
they expressed confidence that they would be able to handle the situation and persuade 
Kennard to refrain from any further action or attempt to enter Mississippi Southern 
College.”  Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 36.  Incidentally, the extensive use of black informers like White did not 
go unnoticed by civil rights activists.  In 1959, Medgar Evers told an audience in Los 
Angeles that blacks were profiting from “segregation and human misery” in Mississippi 
by accepting payment from the Sovereignty Commission. Memorandum from Zack J. 
Van Landingham on Medgar Evers to File 1-23 (July 24, 1959) (on file with the 
Mississippi Department of Archives and History). 
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Precisely because he was willing to engage in accommodation, 
Coleman’s extensive use of black informers helped him preempt direct 
action protest and arguably subvert civil rights activism in the state.  At 
the very least, it helped him pierce the otherwise opaque veil that hid 
black political organizing from white officials.  Black agents became the 
state’s eyes and ears, enabling Coleman and his Sovereignty Commission to 
intervene directly in the lives of local people engaged in political protest 
at the grassroots level. 
Of course, violence remained a constant threat to black activism in 
Mississippi.  Yet, as activists-for-hire such as Gus Courts illustrate, 
white violence had a certain perverse currency in the civil rights world.  
Although it clearly threatened black lives, it also helped the black cause, 
providing the NAACP with clear evidence that segregation was far from 
the system of “peaceable” government that J.P. Coleman tried to 
project.148  Interestingly, this led Coleman to rail against the manner in 
which the NAACP paraded victims of white violence like Courts around 
the country, trying to win sympathy for the black cause.  In fact, in 
March 1957, Coleman even traveled to Washington to testify against 
Wilkins before a United States Senate subcommittee.  The occasion for 
the testimony was a civil rights bill, precisely the kind of federal 
intervention that Coleman had feared might happen if the South did not 
feign compliance with Brown.
Committed to equating Mississippi with murder, Roy Wilkins told the 
Senate subcommittee how Gus Courts had been “shot and seriously 
wounded” by a white man in his own store in Belzoni, Mississippi, 
simply for trying to vote.149  Such acts of racial violence, lamented 
Wilkins, were not being solved by local authorities and required federal 
action.  Coleman, who had of course been trying to improve Mississippi’s 
criminal justice system precisely to avoid such eventualities, testified 
that accounts of racial violence in Mississippi were exaggerated.150
Complaining that Mississippi had become a “whipping boy,” Coleman 
told the subcommittee that only four African-Americans were killed by 
148. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
149. Civil Rights—1957: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of 
the Comm. on the Judiciary United States S., 85th Cong. 291, 300 (1957) (statement of 
Roy Wilkins, Executive Secretary, NAACP). 
150. Civil Rights—1957: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of 
the Comm. on the Judiciary United States S., 85th Cong. 741 (1957) (statement of James 
P. Coleman, Governor, Mississippi). 
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whites in 1955, while one hundred fifty-nine blacks “killed each 
other.”151  He testified that white Mississippians “do not deserve a 
blanket indictment just because there were 4 Negroes killed by the 
whites in that State in 1955, while the Negroes were busily engaged in 
killing 159 of their own number.”152  Coleman’s message tried to 
downplay the rate of racially motivated white-on-black murders in the 
state by emphasizing black-on-black crime.  This emphasis on black 
criminality represented a new way of deflecting attention from racially 
motivated killings, not to mention the shortcomings of local law 
enforcement.  Of course, Coleman did not mention that he was, at that 
very moment, engaged in the process of trying to improve such law 
enforcement.  Perhaps he felt that such a concession would lend 
credence to Wilkins’s point.  Instead, he attacked the manner in which 
the NAACP used white-on-black killings as chess pieces in “national 
politics.”153  Meanwhile, he blasted Wilkins for not mentioning black-
on-black murders, presumably because they were not as politically 
relevant.154  Trying to paint Wilkins as a propagandist, Coleman struggled 
to reassure the subcommittee that federal legislation would not “aid . . . 
the Negro” at all, but rather would become a “continuous source of 
agitation, uproar, tumult, and domestic discord.”155 Here we catch a 
glimpse of the manner in which Coleman perceived civil rights gains to 
jeopardize larger state interests, most notably the preservation of peace 
and tranquility.  Here also we see evidence of the manner in which 
Coleman and Wilkins fought publicly over whether federal intervention 
should be increased in the state, long before the direct action campaigns 
of 1963 and 1965. 
Despite his best efforts, Coleman’s testimony did not prevent the 
enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1957.  Desperate to get some kind 
of civil rights legislation passed, Lyndon Johnson, with an eye on the 
Presidency, made a series of compromises to push the bill through.  
Though weakened by concessions, the Act reaffirmed Coleman’s 
conviction that white violence could be used strategically by civil rights 
groups to win more robust federal enforcement of Brown.
VII. MACK CHARLES PARKER
In April 1959, during Coleman’s final year in office, an African-
American named Mack Charles Parker was kidnapped from jail in 
151. Id. at 740, 741. 
152. Id. at 741. 
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 739. 
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Poplarville, tortured, killed, and left floating in the Pearl River.  Four 
years had passed since the lynching of Emmett Till and, although there 
had been a lull in racial violence, Parker’s murder stirred old fears, 
particularly in Coleman.156  To the Governor, Parker’s murder created 
yet another opportunity for civil rights groups such as the NAACP to 
generate negative propaganda favoring more aggressive federal legislation 
in the South.  Already, the Senate Judiciary Committee was conducting 
hearings on a second proposed civil rights bill—one that Coleman 
wanted desperately to stop.  Coleman feared that Parker’s murder would 
add momentum to the bill, particularly because it involved the flagrant 
kidnapping of a prisoner from a county jail.  This brazen act of defiance, 
Coleman feared, would bolster longstanding NAACP claims that racial 
violence was tacitly sanctioned by Southern state officials, a claim that, 
if true, bolstered the case for federal intervention in the region. 
Coleman also feared that Parker’s killing could destabilize a precarious 
equilibrium between moderate strategies of resistance to Brown and the 
Supreme Court.  Since the murder of Emmett Till, for example, there 
had not been one case of integration in the state.  In fact, in 1958 the 
Supreme Court had even invalidated massive resistance and tentatively 
endorsed pupil placement, two developments that boded well for 
Coleman’s moderate approach.157  Of course, if the Court began to 
suspect that national support for aggressive enforcement of civil rights in 
Mississippi was growing, then it might feel pressure to revisit placement 
plans and perhaps even invalidate them.  Coleman, naturally, did not 
want this to happen.  In many ways, he stood on the verge of victory 
over both the NAACP and the Citizens’ Councils, a position that drove 
him to take a particularly adamant stance against the vigilante killing of 
Mack Charles Parker.158
In a controversial move that sought to preempt the NAACP’s demands 
for federal intervention in the South, Coleman requested that the federal 
government intervene in the case, even inviting the FBI to investigate 
the Parker kidnapping and murder.  He also wrote a letter to Southern 
governors, asking them to join him in a conference to “come up with the 
 156. Interview of J.P. Coleman, supra note 20, at 95–96. 
 157. Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 358 U.S. 101 (1958) (mem.), aff’g
162 F. Supp. 372, 383–84 (N.D. Ala. 1958). 
 158. The Supreme Court declared interposition invalid in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 
1, 16–20 (1958).  It also sanctioned Alabama’s pupil placement law in Shuttlesworth, 358 
U.S. 101. 
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best possible methods of solution” for preventing similar acts of racial 
violence in the future.159  Such a meeting, he hoped, would send a clear 
message to the country that Southern officials did not endorse racial 
violence, hopefully deflecting any negative publicity created by the 
crime. 
Interestingly, Southern governors disagreed over whether such a stance 
was necessary.  Some, such as Virginia Governor Lindsay Almond, supported 
Coleman’s proposal.  “I share your view,” wrote Almond, “that the time 
is now for the Governors of the southern states to sit down in conference 
and discuss this matter, resolving our views to the end that law and order 
shall and must prevail throughout the Southland.”160  Other governors, 
however, declined.  “Without second, sober thought,” noted South Carolina 
Governor Ernest F. Hollings, “my immediate reaction is ‘no.’”161  According 
to Hollings, the furor over the Parker killing was “not near so bad as 
your letter indicates,” and a top level meeting of Southern governors 
would only “give credence” to allegations by civil rights groups like the 
NAACP that “something really is wrong with the South.”162
Hollings’s response was arguably naïve.  By refusing to meet, he and 
other governors probably only gave the NAACP more opportunities to 
make the South look recalcitrant.  Of course, not all Southern governors 
understood as well as Coleman did just how determined black activists 
were to use white violence to their own advantage.  In fact, the 
divergence of opinion between Hollings and Almond was indicative of a 
larger rift forming among Southern leaders at the time.  To most, like 
Almond, the days of massive resistance were over and a new era of 
resistance was beginning, one in which the South needed to pursue 
legalist evasion, meanwhile taking aggressive action to control racial 
violence and to project a positive national image.  To others, however, 
defiance was still desirable, if for no other reason than it won votes.  
Hollings, for example, had just won a battle against University of South 
Carolina President Donald Russell in 1958 precisely by blasting him for 
being soft on segregation.163  Now, he made a point to reject Coleman’s 
meeting, perhaps fearing that it could be taken as a concession to the 
NAACP.
 159. Letter from J.P. Coleman, Governor, Miss., to John Patterson, Governor, Ala. 
(May 6, 1959) (on file with the Mississippi Department of Archives and History). 
 160. Letter from J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., Governor, Va., to J.P. Coleman, Governor, 
Miss. (May 8, 1959) (on file with the Mississippi Department of Archives and History). 
 161. Letter from Ernest F. Hollings, Governor, S.C., to J.P. Coleman, Governor, 
Miss. (May 8, 1959) (on file with the Mississippi Department of Archives and History). 
162. Id.
 163. EARL BLACK, SOUTHERN GOVERNORS AND CIVIL RIGHTS: RACIAL SEGREGATION 
AS A CAMPAIGN ISSUE IN THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION 80, 82 (1976). 
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Disappointed, Coleman traveled to Washington to testify against the 
second federal civil rights bill in three years, meanwhile finding himself 
bombarded by questions about Mack Charles Parker.  “How [did] they 
get the key?” asked Colorado Senator John A. Carroll, referring to the 
manner in which the mob gained access to the prisoner; “[w]as there a 
conspiracy on the part of the sheriff or the jailers?”164  H. Slayman, Jr., 
the subcommittee’s chief counsel, asked Coleman why a grand jury 
hearing to indict the suspects would not be held until November, a delay 
that Coleman attributed to scheduling.  Questions continued, revolving 
around black voting rights, black rights to jury trials, and even whether 
the Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission was involved.  Coleman 
tried desperately to bring the focus of the committee back to the 
proposed civil rights bill, but with little success.165  He ended up making 
a somewhat futile reference to the degree of support that he had received 
among African-Americans in Mississippi for the public schools that he 
had built⎯a non sequitur that had little to do with the subcommittee’s 
main topic of interest.166
Despite frustrations like the one that he had encountered in 
Washington in May 1959, Coleman’s four years in office proved 
remarkably successful.  He managed to push key pieces of legislation 
through the Mississippi House and Senate, increasing the centralized 
power of the state’s law enforcement capabilities, while also providing 
local officials with opportunities to keep black children out of white 
schools.  Coleman also enjoyed a considerable amount of success in 
neutralizing potentially combustible racial protests.  He subverted Clyde 
Kennard and Clennon King, both applicants to Mississippi universities, 
who could arguably have triggered riots.  He also worked hard to keep 
outside activists like Martin Luther King, Jr., out of the state, to buy 
information, and to rein in local sheriffs and justices of the peace. 
Perhaps Coleman’s biggest failure lay in his inability to retain the 
confidence of white voters.  Despite the many accomplishments of his 
administration, white voters replaced him with an outspoken segregationist 
and Citizens’ Councils member named Ross Barnett in 1960.167
164. Civil Rights—1959: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of 
the Comm. on the Judiciary United States S., 86th Cong. 1325 (1959) (statement of 
James P. Coleman, Governor, Mississippi). 
165. Id. at 1309–37. 
166. Id. at 1329–30. 
 167. BLACK, supra note 163, at 60–63. 
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Although Barnett would go on to obscure many of the gains that 
Coleman made by fueling both violence and extremism in the state, he 
would only survive one term.168  Indeed, as the next section will show, 
Coleman would have the final say when his old friend Lyndon Johnson 
appointed him to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1965. 
VIII. SHAVED HEAD AND MOONSHINE
Only weeks after President Johnson signed a historic Voting Rights 
Act into law in August 1965, he appointed Coleman to the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals.  At the time, the Fifth Circuit had become celebrated 
for pro-civil rights opinions thanks to Republican Judges John Minor 
Wisdom and Elbert Tuttle.  Tuttle had even confronted allegations of 
corruption for assigning civil rights cases to liberal judges, meanwhile 
keeping them out of the hands of reactionaries like Mississippi Judge 
Ben Cameron.  In the spring of 1965, Cameron died, leaving a seat on 
the court open.  Although Johnson could theoretically have appointed 
anyone he wanted to the court⎯including a liberal on civil rights 
issues⎯he chose Coleman. 
Perhaps the best reason for his choice was electoral politics.  Coleman 
had endorsed Johnson in 1964, and both Johnson and Kennedy in the 
1960 presidential elections.  He also enjoyed the endorsement of 
powerful Southern congressional leaders like Mississippi Senator James 
O. Eastland, who put on hold any disagreement that he might have had 
with Coleman.  Even Robert Kennedy, who knew that Coleman had 
helped elect his brother President, lobbied for the former Mississippi 
Governor.  Finally, Johnson, who at that point was still considering a 
second bid for the Presidency in 1968, was arguably reluctant to appoint 
a liberal to the Fifth Circuit, knowing that such a decision might 
jeopardize his chances of winning Southern support at the polls. 
Not surprisingly, Coleman’s appointment⎯a fairly bold move considering 
his segregationist credentials⎯proved controversial.  During two days 
of hearings before a special subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, opponents to Coleman’s nomination presented a litany of 
reasons why he should not be appointed to the federal judiciary.  To take 
just a few examples, John Conyers, an African-American Representative 
from Michigan, testified against Coleman, calling him a “calculating 
legal technician” who had manipulated “the judicial process in order to 
168. Id.
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protect a racist social order” in Mississippi.169  John Lewis, Chairman of 
the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), called Coleman’s 
appointment “an affront and an insult” to African-Americans of the 
South.170  Even Martin Luther King, Jr., prepared a statement in opposition 
to Coleman’s nomination, noting that the Fifth Circuit had “been the 
major constitutional body to which Negroes might turn in the South” and 
that appointing Coleman to the court would be a setback for the 
movement.171  It would be “a great tragedy” to put Coleman on the Fifth 
Circuit, argued King, particularly given the type of politics “practiced by 
Gov. Coleman during his years as the arch[i]tect of Mississippi’s plans 
to circumvent the orders of the very court to which he now seeks 
appointment.”172
Despite King’s protests, Coleman won Senate approval and used his 
new position on the Fifth Circuit to continue the trajectory that he had 
begun as governor: limiting violence and improving legal process.173  In 
a consolidation of cases decided in October 1966, Coleman voted to 
allow civil rights activists facing trial in Mississippi a chance to present 
evidence in federal district court to the effect that their arrests had been 
racially motivated.  If they could prove that this was the case, held 
Coleman, then they should be released.174  Four months later, Coleman 
decided two cases, one in which members of the Mississippi Freedom 
Democratic Party (MFDP) had been arrested for distributing leaflets in 
violation of an anti-leafleting ordinance and another in which MFDP 
members had been arrested for marching in violation of traffic regulations.  
169. Nomination of James P. Coleman: Hearings Before a Spec. Subcomm. of the 
Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary United States S., 89th Cong. 19 
(1965) (statement of John Conyers, Jr., Representative in Congress, Michigan). 
170. Id. at 40 (statement of John Lewis, Chairman, Student Non-Violent Coordinating 
Committee). 
 171. Press Release, Martin Luther King, Jr., President, Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference (1965) (on file with the King Library and Archives). 
172. Id.
 173. Coleman’s tendency to uphold certain civil rights claims has led scholars like 
Frank T. Read and Lucy McGough to take a relatively uncritical view of Coleman’s 
jurisprudence. See FRANK T. READ & LUCY S. MCGOUGH, LET THEM BE JUDGED: THE
JUDICIAL INTEGRATION OF THE DEEP SOUTH 178–79, 443 (1978). 
 174. Hartfield v. Mississippi, 367 F.2d 362, 364 (5th Cir. 1966) (citing Georgia v. 
Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 (1966)).  Jack Bass notes how Rachel was itself a limitation on the 
removal power forged by Chief Judge Elbert Tuttle.  See JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES:
THE DRAMATIC STORY OF THE SOUTHERN JUDGES OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT WHO 
TRANSLATED THE SUPREME COURT’S BROWN DECISION INTO A REVOLUTION FOR EQUALITY
291 (1981). 
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In both cases, Coleman ruled the ordinances unconstitutionally vague, 
particularly for the manner in which they threatened free speech.175  Not 
long thereafter, Coleman confronted an appeal by William Eaton and 
Collie Wilkins, Jr., two white Alabamans found guilty of murdering 
Viola Liuzzo, a white mother of five who had traveled south to participate 
in a massive civil rights march from Selma to Montgomery.176  Rejecting 
their argument that they should have been tried in state and not federal 
court, Coleman read into their crime a deprivation of Liuzzo’s right to 
participate in federal elections, thereby securing their convictions.177
Such rulings coincided nicely with Coleman’s longstanding interest in 
controlling extremism, curtailing violence, and improving legal process.  
They also set the stage for a series of rulings that would gradually align 
federal law against civil rights demonstrators.  In May 1969, for example, 
Coleman wrote the majority opinion in a case brought by black demonstrators 
arrested for picketing in Hattiesburg, Mississippi.  Specifically, the 
demonstrators appealed an injunction, issued by a district judge and 
outspoken segregationist named Harold Cox, which allowed the 
demonstrators to picket but limited them to six demonstrators per 
location, demanded them to remain at least five feet apart, and required 
them to remain absolutely silent.178  Coleman, upon reviewing the 
record, determined that the picketers were in fact attempting to provoke 
violence by singing “freedom songs” that included “words of a generally 
threatening nature.”179  Noting that the Constitution prohibited the state 
from silencing protesters completely, however, Coleman modified the 
injunction to prohibit speech “clearly calculated to provoke a breach of 
the peace by others.”180
Although at first glance a relatively innocuous holding, Coleman’s 
decision to sustain Cox’s injunction did at least two things.  First, it 
muted civil rights protest by lowering the number of street protesters that 
could lawfully picket a business to six, a relatively small number.  
Second, it granted law enforcement a relatively broad amount of 
discretion in determining what was and was not “calculated to provoke a 
breach of the peace.”  Given that so much of civil rights movement 
activity had attempted to provoke breaches of the peace in 1963, 1964, 
 175. Guyot v. Pierce, 372 F.2d 658, 662–63 (5th Cir. 1967); Strother v. Thompson, 
372 F.2d 654, 657 (5th Cir. 1967). 
 176. Wilkins v. United States, 376 F.2d 552, 557–59 (5th Cir. 1967). 
177. Id. at 561–62. 
 178. For more on Cox’s segregationist views, see Neil R. McMillen, Black 
Enfranchisement in Mississippi: Federal Enforcement and Black Protest in the 1960s, 43 
J. S. HIST. 351, 357–58 (1977). 
 179. Smith v. Grady, 411 F.2d 181, 187 (5th Cir. 1969). 
180. Id. at 189. 
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and 1965, this suggests that Coleman was joining other conservative 
judges, like Cox, to discourage such activity.  Although certainly not an 
absolute endorsement of Cox’s rather draconian order, it arguably 
indicated a move to limit demonstrators.181
Coleman shortened the leash even further in August 1970.  That 
month, Coleman voted against the family of Benjamin Brown, an SNCC 
activist who had been shot and killed when police fired into a crowd of 
demonstrators in Jackson.  Unsympathetic to the Browns’ claim that 
they should have been allowed access to the police files in the case, 
Coleman argued that it was a “favorite ploy of the law violator” to sue 
police on “some pretext or another.”182  Downplaying the fact that 
Brown had been brutally killed for what appeared to be no good reason, 
Coleman sided firmly with law enforcement, arguing that “fishing” 
expeditions into police files should not be allowed, lest they undermine 
the “judicial process.”183
Two weeks later, Coleman ruled against another civil rights activist in 
Louisiana who was charged with battery and requested removal from 
state to federal court.  The facts of this case were particularly remarkable.  
Sometime on the evening of July 28, 1966, an African-American activist 
named Zelma Wyche led a group of over fifty blacks, some of them 
armed, to a truck stop in Tallulah, Louisiana, to investigate a report that 
the café had denied service to a black patron.184  Upon arriving at the 
café, Wyche demanded the manager’s presence. After a patron suggested 
that Wyche look for the manager himself, the activist retorted, “What is 
it to you?  Do you want your—whipped?”185  When the patron tried to 
 181. In December 1969, Coleman issued a similar ruling, this time upholding the 
right of a university to suspend students for engaging in direct action protest.  In this 
case, brought by students who were suspended from Southwest Texas State University 
for mounting demonstrations, Coleman broke from the majority and held that colleges 
had the right to tell students when and where they could protest.  Bayless v. Martine, 430 
F.2d 872, 873 (5th Cir. 1969) (Coleman, J., dissenting). 
 182. Brown v. Thompson, 430 F.2d 1214, 1217–18 (5th Cir. 1970) (Coleman, J., 
dissenting).  For further mention of this case, see CLAYBORNE CARSON, IN STRUGGLE:
SNCC AND THE BLACK AWAKENING OF THE 1960S, at 254–55 (1981); DITTMER, supra
note 40, at 413–14. 
183. Brown, 430 F.2d at 1217–18. 
 184. Wyche v. Hester, 431 F.2d 791, 792–93, 798 (5th Cir. 1970).  Wyche was the 
President of the Madison Parish Voters League in Madison Parish, Louisiana.  Id. at 792.  
He would go on to become the first black sheriff of Tallulah County.  See Top Cop in 
Tallulah, TIME, Mar. 2, 1970, at 17. 
185. Wyche, 431 F.2d at 798 (Coleman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part).
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leave, Wyche gave “two shrill whistles,” prompting several members of 
the black entourage to attack the customer.  Only when another white 
customer produced a shotgun did the attackers desist.186
To Coleman, this type of aggressive civil rights vigilantism was 
completely unacceptable.  In his dissenting opinion, Coleman argued 
that Wyche was not engaged in protected activity and should not have 
been allowed to remove his case to federal court.  Yet the majority 
disagreed, granting Wyche a hearing at the federal district level to 
determine whether his battery charge should in fact have been removed 
to federal court under the theory that he had been engaged in 
constitutionally protected activity.  Lamenting the ruling, Coleman noted 
that the majority had inflicted a “Sunday punch” on the “sagging ability 
of local governments to enforce their laws against crimes of violence.”187
Two years after being outvoted in Wyche, Coleman gained the upper 
hand.  In January 1972, he delivered a majority opinion that challenged 
the ability of nonviolent protesters to have their cases removed from 
state to federal court, thereby undermining the expanded removal 
remedy that the Fifth Circuit had worked hard to develop in the 1960s.188
Specifically, Coleman confronted an appeal from a group of student 
activists who had been commuting regularly to Mendenhall, Mississippi, 
from Jackson in January and February of 1970 to participate in marches 
and demonstrations.189  One night after a demonstration, the appellants 
were pulled over by state troopers and arrested for reckless driving.  The 
students were then taken to the local jail, where troopers and county 
police shaved the leader’s head and poured moonshine on his scalp.190
Though the act drew no blood and left no scar, it sent the victim into fits 
of pain, torturing him. 
Coleman showed little interest.  Although considerable evidence existed 
to suggest that the troopers had engaged in torture to discourage civil 
rights, Coleman went out of his way to defend the police.  According to 
him, the fact that the demonstrations were in one county and the arrest in 
another, coupled with police testimony that the driver had been veering 
between lanes, suggested that there was no relation between the 
demonstrations and the arrests.  Because the arrests were not designed 
186. Id.
187. Id.
 188. The case was Perkins v. Mississippi (Perkins I), 455 F.2d 7 (5th Cir. 1972).  
The Supreme Court had approved Tuttle’s innovations, albeit in a somewhat restricted 
form, in City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 834–35 (1966), and in Georgia v. 
Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 805–06 (1966). 
189. Perkins I, 455 F.2d at 8. 
190. Id. at 8–9. 
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to interfere with constitutional rights, he continued, the case should 
be remanded to state court.191
Judge John R. Brown disagreed in a vigorous and lengthy dissent, 
warning that Coleman’s opinion threatened not only to limit the removal 
remedy but also to excuse a blatant attempt to prevent citizens from 
exercising their constitutional rights.  Noting that the state troopers had 
been present at the demonstration, had taken photographs of the 
activists, and had later followed the van out of Mendenhall, Brown 
concluded that the true motivation behind the arrest was to prevent 
further demonstrations, not to apprehend reckless drivers.  Bolstering 
this conclusion, argued Brown, was the torture of the leader, along with 
evidence that the state troopers had warned him about participating in 
civil rights activities in Mendenhall before, promising that they were 
“not going to take any more of this civil rights stuff.”192  All of these 
factors combined, concluded Brown, to show that both the arrests and 
the state prosecution were a “classic example of the misuse of State 
criminal procedures for the sole purpose of intimidating the exercise of 
equal civil rights.”193
Coleman⎯relying heavily on the testimony of the state troopers 
involved⎯stood fast.  To him, the relatively obvious targeting of the 
activists by the police was less important than the lawlessness that the 
activists themselves were engaged in.  Shifting attention from the police 
to the activists and their friends, Coleman focused on the fact that two 
acquaintances of the demonstrators, both ministers, had arrived at the jail 
where the activists were being held with weapons in their car, pleading 
for their release.  Though the ministers left their weapons as they entered 
the station, an altercation ensued between them and the police, during 
which a sheriff was allegedly punched in the face.  To Coleman, this 
type of aggressive civil rights “activism” was unacceptable.  “[W]e are 
under no duty,” he wrote, “to extend some kind of left handed judicial 
approval to the practice of carrying an arsenal of weapons on night time 
visits to jails or police stations, even if the possession of such weapons is 
otherwise lawful.”194
191. Id. at 11. 
192. Id. at 15 n.7 (Brown, C.J., dissenting). 
193. Id. at 58 (Brown, C.J., dissenting).  Brown rooted his dissent in two Supreme 
Court opinions.  See Peacock, 384 U.S. 808; Rachel, 384 U.S. 780. 
194. Perkins I, 455 F.2d at 10–11. 
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Though the visit by the two ministers to the jail arguably had nothing 
to do with the viability of the constitutional claims of the arrested 
students, Coleman’s holding reflected a new angle of attack against 
direct action protest.  Instead of a decision about civil rights, Coleman 
transformed his opinion into a defense of law enforcement.  According 
to him, state police had not gone after civil rights activists, but rather 
civil rights protesters had sent armed emissaries after the police.195
Perhaps surprisingly, Coleman won support for this position.  Twelve 
months after overruling Judge Brown, he marshaled a majority en banc 
opinion on the same case over the protests of John Minor Wisdom.196
Although Wisdom joined Brown in arguing for a broad reading of the 
removal remedy, the en banc majority affirmed Coleman’s holding that 
the measure did not allow the federal government to intervene when law 
enforcement was “lawfully carrying out” its duties.197  Although there 
was substantial evidence to suggest that this was not happening, as 
illustrated by the torture of the Jackson civil rights leader, the majority 
joined Coleman in rejecting the compensatory claims of the demonstrators.198
Though briefly overshadowed by state politics, Coleman’s commitment 
to ending public violence and bolstering law enforcement had eventually 
taken hold in the federal courts. 
IX. CONCLUSION
Several factors contributed to the ascendance of Coleman’s law 
enforcement vision.  One was Coleman’s ability to reframe resistance to 
civil rights in a racially neutral manner, something that he had begun to 
do while Governor of Mississippi in the 1950s.  Another was a dramatic 
change in how those who challenged racial norms were handled in the 
Deep South.  Taking the Mendenhall case as an example, the act of 
applying alcohol to a newly shaved head, though excruciating, lacked 
the potential to generate the kind of outrage that Emmett Till’s mangled 
corpse had in 1955.  This explains Coleman’s willingness to reject the 
claims of the Mendenhall demonstrators.  He had worked hard to modernize 
law enforcement in Mississippi precisely because he understood how 
acts of public violence could jeopardize Southern interests.  Bloodless 
 195. Critical to this was evidence that the demonstrators who did return from 
Mendenhall issued an “alarm” regarding the arrest of the appellants, leading the ministers to 
visit the jail.  Such confrontation, Coleman suggested, should be discouraged, not 
constitutionally protected.  Id. at 8, 10. 
196. Id. at 61; Perkins v. Mississippi (Perkins II), 470 F.2d 1371, 1371 (5th Cir. 
1972) (en banc). 
197. Perkins II, 470 F.2d at 1371 (citing 18 U.S.C.A. § 245(c)). 
198. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808; Rachel, 384 U.S. 780. 
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acts of private violence, on the other hand, particularly those that had 
caused no “spectacle” and had made no mark, left Coleman indifferent.199
So long as torturers devised traceless methods of administering pain, 
torture could continue. 
Although it would be a mistake to equate Mississippi with the rest of 
the South, Coleman endorsed reforms that dramatically altered the 
balance of power in his state, removing autonomy from local officials 
and granting it to centralized authorities.  To take just a few examples, 
he expanded the jurisdiction and reach of state police, improved 
information gathering, and extended appellate review to local justices of 
the peace.  Although Coleman’s ultimate goal was to facilitate evasion 
of Brown, many of these reforms had a positive effect on African-
Americans who had long known the state to be complicit in public 
torture and killing. 
Not just a representative of Mississippi, J.P. Coleman ended up having 
an influence on much of the region as a Fifth Circuit judge.  At the time, 
the Fifth Circuit controlled most of the Deep South, including 
Mississippi, Louisiana, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, and Texas.200  As an 
appellate judge, Coleman punished public killers like the murderers of 
Viola Liuzzo but not police who pursued more “gentle” forms of 
punishment, like the shaving of the activist in Mendenhall.201  In so 
doing, Coleman sent a relatively clear message that the era of public 
torture and murder for racial transgressions had come to an end.  Though 
he was certainly not alone in drawing the curtain on lynching, his role as 
governor of one of the South’s most recalcitrant states during the height 
of massive resistance⎯coupled with his role on the Fifth Circuit in the 
1970s and 1980s⎯makes him a particularly compelling lens through 
which to view transformations in how the South dealt with race.  Many 
of his reforms live on in Mississippi today, just as his judicial opinions 
remain a part of federal law.  Coleman’s story helps to show how 
Southern attitudes towards the “spectacle of the scaffold” evolved 
relatively quickly in the aftermath of Brown and the murder of Emmett 
Till.202
 199. FOUCAULT, supra note 11, at 32.
 200. The Fifth Circuit split into the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits in 1981.  Largest 
U.S. Appeals Court to Split Thursday, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 27, 1981, at 2. 
201. See supra text accompanying note 11. 
 202. FOUCAULT, supra note 11, at 32.
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